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DUE PROCESS IN A PRIVATIZED WELFARE SYSTEM*
David J. Kennedyt
INTRODUCTION
The dust of the 1996 Presidential campaign had barely settled
before Bill Clinton and Governor George Bush took aim at each
other. In the spring of 1997, the Clinton Administration formally
rejected Governor Bush's proposal to privatize elements of Texas'
welfare, Medicaid, and Food Stamp programs.' The Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
("PRWORA") had allowed the states to use private corporations to
operate certain state benefit programs.2 Texas had already permitted
private companies to administer several components of its state
welfare system; under its waiver request, it sought to privatize the
entire system. The Department of Health and Human Services
ultimately denied Texas' waiver request on the ground that it would
empower private sector employees to determine eligibility for
Medicaid and Food Stamps.'
President Clinton's rejection of Texas' waiver application ap-
peared to be based on his desire to curry favor with labor unions.'
© 1998 David J. Kennedy. All Rights Reserved.
Public Interest Law Fellow and Staff Attorney, Alliance for Justice, Washington
D.C. B.A., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School. For their advice and assistance
with various stages of this Article, I would like to thank Anne Alstott, Paula Gaber,
Kathleen A. Sullivan, and Zy Weinberg. I would particularly like to thank Barbara Leyser
for sharing her extensive store of knowledge on Electronic Benefits Transfer.
' See Sam Howe Verhovek, Clinton Reining in Role for Business in Welfare Effort,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997, § 1, at 1.
2 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1994)).
3 See Michael Totty, Plan to Privatize Welfare Services Spawns Novel Bidding Part-
nerships, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1996, at TI (listing state programs already privatized).
4 See White House Limits States in Privatizing Welfare, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1997,
at A20. Texas was still permitted to continue using private corporations to operate its
own state benefit system. See id. Governor Bush has indicated that he may proceed
with elements of the rejected privatization plan anyway. See Verhovek, supra note 1, at
1.
5 See Verhovek, supra note 1, at 1. This is not to say that there were no valid
reasons to oppose the Texas plan. See Max B. Sawicky, Welfare Privatization is Texans'
Greased Piglet, Hous. CHRON., May 5, 1997, at 21. Sawicky argues:
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Governor Bush's effort to privatize most of Texas' welfare system, in
turn, seemed rooted in his attempt to make a name for himself with
the kind of bold experimentation that could carry him to national
office.6 Yet while neither Bush nor Clinton treated it as such, the
political jockeying in this instance was of critical national concern.
After fighting so hard for greater authority over the welfare system,
states seem strangely eager to pass the prize to private corpora-
tions.7 This effort to privatize welfare could have lasting repercus-
sions for the lives of the American poor. The fact that few attached
much importance to the merits of privatizing welfare in one of the
nation's largest states illustrates how the debate on this issue is
unformed and unfocused. This Article attempts to redress that
problem.
It is clear that the American welfare system is undergoing dra-
matic change. However, this change has been negotiated, imple-
mented, and critiqued largely in terms of the relationship between
the states and the federal government. Equally important is another,
less obvious, reallocation of authority: from state entities in charge
of benefit distribution to private corporations seeking to profit from
welfare reform. The privatization of welfare is perhaps a more sig-
nificant development than defederalization: while the ever-shifting
balance of federal-state relations could tip once again in favor of
federal dominance,' power once acquiesced to the private sector
All the harbingers of this deal are unpromising. We have secret plans, with-
held data, wildly ambitious estimates of cost savings, important questions of
legality, contractors with terrible records of corporate responsibility, state offi-
cials and corporate lobbyists in the proverbial revolving door and two pro-
grams that are essential to brute, physical survival of the most vulnerable
members of society. The president should deny Gov. Bush the imprimatur he
seeks.
Id.
6 See Gerard Baker, 'Little Fellow in Texas' Eyes Dad's Old Job in Washington, FIN.
TiMEs, June 19, 1997, at 5 ("Nothing illustrates the radicalism better than his welfare
reform legislation, which aimed to privatize much of the state's provision of assistance to
the neediest.').
' The major beneficiaries of the Texas plan would have been Lockheed Martin, the
military contractor, and Electronic Data Systems, the Medicaid claims processing compa-
ny started by 1992 third-party presidential candidate H. Ross Perot. See John Harwood,
Locking Horns: EDS, Lockheed Duel Over Contract to Run Texas' Welfare System, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 19, 1997, at Al. Since Texas was compelled to adopt a more piecemeal
approach to welfare privatization, Lockheed has assumed a dominant role. See Miriam
Rozen, Doling for Dollars, DALLAS OBSERVER, May 8, 1998.
8 See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An
American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y
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will not be lightly surrendered. Recent technological advances in
benefit provision, moreover, significantly accelerate the privatization
of welfare; while these advances hold forth the promise of a more
efficient welfare system, they may become invidious instruments of
social control.
This Article argues that the transition from public to private
welfare services, and from paper-based applications to electronic
benefit transfer (EBT), dramatically redefines the due process rights
of the poor. By delegating the public welfare to private corpora-
tions, states have placed highly vulnerable populations at the mercy
of the market. Although the rush to award welfare contracts to
private corporations promises to save the states money, experience
suggests that privatization has undesirable financial, not to mention
moral, costs. New welfare technologies are also highly overrated.
Foolproof fraud prevention technologies often prove to be merely
foolish. Beyond the purported benefits of improved technologies,
such systems could easily be used to invade the private lives of
many benefit recipients. A plastic benefit card usable at automated
teller machines (ATMs) and grocery stores, for example, has the
potential to do what a room of social welfare bureaucrats never
could: detail how every last dollar of benefits is spent. In that re-
gard, the possibilities for exploitation of dependent populations are
higher than ever before.
Of course, privatization is not inherently bad; most Americans
believe that carving out a larger role for private initiative, creativity,
and financing leads to innovation and improvement. This Article
will discuss how technological advances could reduce the stigma
borne by welfare recipients and provide benefits more rapidly and
accurately. The point is that the rapid pace of devolution from the
federal government to the states has set off a fever of often ill-ad-
vised, and occasionally irreversible, experiment. This Article sug-
gests a set of standards and rules that protect the due process rights
of the indigent against the newly potent forces of corporate profi-
teers.
Part I of this Article will reexamine the standard story of pover-
ty law scholarship. On this account, welfare policy has evolved
from in-person application and recertification interviews by trained
social work professionals to mass administrative procedures imple-
mented by unskilled caseworkers. Thus, the goal of serving vast
REv./YALE J. ON REG. 227, 227-96 (1996).
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benefit populations gradually replaces the effort to meet individual
needs. The increasingly important role of technology and superior
information processing, however, changes the expected course of
affairs: welfare policy is now becoming both individualistic and
impersonal. Part II will evaluate the three important developments
of the last several years that have drastically altered welfare policy
in the United States: the devolution of control over welfare policy
from the federal government to the states; the newfound reliance on
private companies to provide welfare services; and the development
of new technologies to provide benefits.
After describing a vastly different new world of welfare policy,
this Article will ask whether our old concepts of due process are
adequate to protect the rights of the poor. Part III will explain how
new relationships require new safeguards, and new powers require
new constraints. First, this Article will argue that a new set of proce-
dural controls and rights must be put into place to protect benefit
recipients, as well as the government, from the financially self-inter-
ested behavior of welfare privatizers. The government simply cannot
opt out of the benefit business altogether. Because of the constitu-
tional prohibition on financially interested parties controlling
rulemaking or even low-level adjudication, state involvement will
remain a necessity. These constitutionally required monitoring costs,
moreover, may lead one to ask whether privatization is such a
bargain after all. Second, I will argue that as the move to privatiza-
tion ratchets up the importance of procedural due process
protections, the increased reliance on technology raises a host of
substantive questions that have hardly been answered. The substan-
tive rights of the poor are clearly affected by technological develop-
ments that invade their privacy and assign an informational advan-
tage to the private contractor should a dispute arise. Congress'
decision to exempt EBT accounts, which all Food Stamp beneficia-
ries must have by October 1, 2002, from disclosure requirements
that commonly apply to financial institutions is a disturbing sign that
the promise of EBT will be undermined. This Article will contend
that the existing framework of electronic consumer protection law
should be the appropriate source of procedural rights for EBT recipi-
ents. If a goal of welfare policy is to integrate benefit recipients with
the general population, it would be inconsistent to grant the poor a
different set of procedural due process rights. In fact, because their
participation is involuntary, the poor need greater due process
protections.
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The aim of this Article is not to oppose innovation or techno-
logical advances, but to argue that these potentially liberating devel-
opments, at present, have been turned to improper purposes.9 The
welfare reform bill of 1996 did not completely eliminate the rights
of benefit recipients, and experimentation does not mean "anything
goes." If state governments are intent on reforming welfare through
imprudent, superficial, and irrational policies, a whole new set of
constitutional protections is implicated.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF WELFARE POLICY
Before evaluating the major changes in welfare policy of the
past few years, it is worth analyzing the backdrop of reform. By
1996, policymakers all over the political spectrum agreed that the
American social welfare system was in dire need of reform. As one
analyst put it, "Everyone hates welfare."" Conservatives charged
that vast expenditures on the underclass were all for nothing," that
the free handout of benefits undermined basic American values
such as hard work,' and that so-called "welfare queens" were
" See Fred W. Weingarten, Privacy: A Terminal Idea, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 18, 56
(1982) (It is not technology, as such, which affects society for good or bad, but its
uses, which are . . . shaped by the values of society and by the historical context in
which the technology is used.').
10 DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 4 (1988); see
also THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT
MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 16 (1990) ("American social welfare provision has been most
often characterized as ungovernable, unaffordable, or undesirable-sometimes all three at
once.'); Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again
and the Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 213
(1996) ("In the contemporary American political lexicon, welfare is a perjorative term.").
11 See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980
(1984). Murray's major contribution to the debate has been the assertion that while
expenditures on the poor have vastly increased, the number of the poor has not gone
down, but increased as well. Numerous commentators have thoroughly refuted Murray's
"perverse effects" analysis. See CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 70-91 (1992); MARMOR ET AL., supra note 10, at 104-15,
105 ('Almost nothing Murray says about the effects of welfare or welfare state policies
on the poor is believed by serious students of the subject.'); Frances Fox Piven & Rich-
ard A. Cloward, The Contemporary Relief Debate, in FRED BLOCK ET AL., THE MEAN SEA-
SON: THE ATrACK ON THE WELFARE STATE 45, 67-92 (1987). However, Murray's thesis
continues to shape the debate over welfare reform. See, e.g., John Goodman, Welfare
Privatization, WALL ST. J., 'May 28, 1996, at A18 ("According to the Congressional Re-
search Service, we have spent $5.4 trillion (in 1992 dollars) on federal means-tested
poverty programs since 1960. Yet the poverty rate is higher today than it was in 1965,
when the War on Poverty started.").
12 The major statement of this theme is LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT:
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
cheating the system by driving up to groceries in limousines to pur-
chase alcohol with their Food Stamps.13 Liberals, on the other
hand, contended that the welfare system failed to guarantee people
enough resources on which to live, that it failed to use jobs, health
care, and child care as part of a coherent approach to lifting people
out of poverty, and that the welfare bureaucracy belittled and
stigmatized recipients."4
This Part will focus on the relationship between the beneficiary
and the state. Unlike the highly contested historical arguments on
social policy, the history of the evolution of the relationship be-
tween state and beneficiary follows a generally accepted trajectory,
plotted out by landmark court cases. On this account, welfare poli-
cy begins as an in-person, individualized series of interactions with
trained social workers. Over time, the system becomes more and
more reliant on untrained workers who attempt to weed out ap-
plicants through various hoops and hurdles, rendering the process
impersonal and collectivized. This standard story is, like most gener-
THE SOCIAL OBUGATIONS OF CmZENSHIP (1986). See also CHARLES LOCKHART, GAINING
GROUND: TAILORING SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO AMERICAN VALUES (1989).
" President Ronald Reagan repeatedly told the tale of a "Chicago welfare queen"
with numerous aliases, addresses, Social Security numbers, and husbands who was col-
lecting $150,000 from the government. See Aaronson, supra note 10, at 227. But cf.
Paul Glastris, Was Reagan Right?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 20, 1997, at 30(suggesting that one result of welfare reform has been to "smoke out" fraudulent claim-
ants). The story was meant to underscore the permissiveness of the welfare state, even
though it more clearly illustrates the problem of incompetent administration. See infra
note 82.
Since Reagan popularized this stereotype, it has taken pernicious root in the welfare
debate. The "welfare queen" need not be involved in fraud; instead, she is the embodi-
ment of a putatively permissive "ghetto culture" entirely reliant on governmental hand-
outs. Dorothy E. Roberts explains that the stereotypical "welfare queen . . . breeds child-
ren at the expense of the taxpayers in order to increase the amount of the welfare
check." Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Col-
or, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1444 (1991). This ste-
reotype is fuel for punitive welfare policies such as family caps, which prevent Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ('AFDC") families from receiving more assistance even
though the mother has another child. See Risa E. Kaufnan, The Cultural Meaning of the
"Welfare Queen": Using State Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 301 (1997).
14 See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 10; Piven & Cloward, supra note 11. For more
impressionistic, yet powerful, accounts of the failure of the American welfare system to
provide for the poorest members of our society, see ALEx KOTLOwrrz, THERE ARE NO
CHILDREN HERE (1991) (describing the lives of young boys in Chicago housing project);
and JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1988)(describing the problem of homelessness in America through the story of a mother and
her children in New York City).
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alized accounts, somewhat simplified. The aim of this Part, howev-
er, is to show that the theory behind the standard story fails to ex-
plain the consequences of the three critical developments addressed
in this Article. The result of greater state control over the operation
of welfare systems, advanced technology, and increased privatiza-
tion is a system that is impersonal yet individualized. In a sense,
welfare bureaucracies now know more and care less about each
individual recipient than ever before. This Part will explain how this
state of affairs is unanticipated in poverty legal scholarship; Part II
will sketch out what these developments mean.
A. From Personal and Invasive to Impersonal and Superficial
Even American antipoverty programs, a constant target of attack
from all over the ideological spectrum, enjoyed an idealized past. In
the "good old days," there was a sincere effort to win the war on
poverty by empowering low-income populations. Paradigmatic of
this approach was the face-to-face meeting between social worker
and benefit recipient; rather than giving out food or clothes to a
long line of needy individuals, welfare agencies sought to establish
a personal rapport with their clients. The "face-to-face" Food Stamp
recertification interview was originally understood "not as a means
to control the recipient and the uses of relief, but as a way to ad-
minister welfare based upon a mutually respectful exchange be-
tween the worker and the applicant.""
Thus, the standard story of the welfare bureaucracy from the
1960s to the present begins with professionalized discretion. 6 Joel
Is Susan D. Bennett, 'No relief but upon the terms of coming into the house'.-
Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban Shelter
System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2185 (1995); see also William H. Simon, The Invention
and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1985) ("From 1935 to the
late 1960s, the Federal Bureau of Public Assistance, which administered the most contro-
versial federal welfare program - Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC-as
well as the old age and disability welfare programs, was dominated by social work
professionals committed to this perspective.').
16 For an account of this transformation, see, for example, Joel F. Handler, Discretion
in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE LJ. 1270 (1983);
William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198 (1983). Michael Sosin divides this period into three parts. The discretionary age of
AFDC provision lasted from 1962 to 1967; the legal rights approach triumphed in 1967
to 1972; and from 1972 to 1980, the social welfare system became increasingly bureau-
cratized. See Michael R. Sosin, Legal Rights and Welfare Change, 1960-1980, in FIGHT-
ING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 260 (Sheldon H. Danziger & Daniel H.
1998]
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Handler has described the welfare system of the early 1960s as
"discretionary, professional, and decentralized." 7 Professional so-
cial workers ran the welfare bureaucracy and brought a generally
compassionate and flexible approach to their work. 8 On this mod-
el, the individual social worker was free of bureaucratic constraints
to act in the best interests of the client. While professionals could
abuse their discretion, 9 welfare recipients at least encountered a
measure of humanity in their dealings with the system.
Of course, with intimacy comes a certain degree of invasive-
ness. Social workers could make the best use of their expertise only
by learning a great deal about exactly what their clients were doing.
When benefit recipients were not forthcoming on such matters,
welfare agencies resorted to "condescending moralism"" to police
the behavior of their clients. Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward, in their landmark book Regulating the Poor, provide a
discussion of the invasiveness problem in the late 1960s and early
1970s:
A central feature of the recipient's degradation is that she must surrender
commonly accepted rights in exchange for aid. AFDC mothers, for exam-
ple, are often forced to answer questions about their sexual behavior
("When did you last menstruate?"), open their closets to inspection
("Whose pants are those?"), and permit their children to be interrogated
("Do any men visit your mother?"). Unannounced raids, usually after
midnight and without benefit of warrant, in which a recipient's home is
searched for signs of "immoral" activities, have also been part of life on
AFDC. 21
The courts took a dim view of these efforts. In King v. Smith, for
example, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama regulation
that discontinued AFDC benefits to households in which there was
a cohabitating father.22 To enforce this regulation, Alabama Depart-
ment of Social Services officers would investigate the recipient's sex
Weinberg eds., 1986).
Handler, supra note 16, at 1270.
18 See Bennett, supra note 15, at 2185; Sosin, supra note 16, at 261.
,' The most common area of abuse of discretion involved home visits to determine,
among other things, whether there was a man cohabitating with the mother of the recip-
ient family unit. See, e.g., J.L. Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 818 (1971); Charles A.
Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE LJ. 1347 (1963).
20 Simon, supra note 15, at 2.
21 FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNC-
TIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 166 (1971).
392 U.S. 309, 314 (1968).
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life. In some counties, a man was considered to be "cohabitating" if
he and the recipient mother had sex once a week; in other coun-
ties, officers considered sexual relations once every six months to
constitute "cohabitation."23 As Justice Douglas pointed out in his
concurring opinion, the statute sought to punish mothers who were
sinful, whether or not the father actually could have played a role
in supporting the family financially.24 Thus, "professionalism" was
simply not enough of a counterweight to the pressures of bureaucra-
cy, rules and regulations, and public opinion.25
According to the standard story, the informal, personalized
world of professional social workers came to an end with the land-
mark welfare rights case of Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970.26 Goldberg,
which required that welfare recipients be afforded a hearing before
their benefits were terminated, imposed legalistic due process re-
quirements on welfare administration. In response, welfare depart-
ments felt compelled to develop specific, precise, written eligibility
requirements to defend agency decisions at a fair hearing.27 These
3 Id. at 314.
24 See id. at 336 (Douglas, J., concurring). Similarly, in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970), AFDC recipients challenged a California law that presumed that the income
of a nonadoptive stepfather or man assuming the role of spouse should be included in
computing a family's AFDC budget. The Court ruled that the state law violated federal
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare regulations.
25 See Sosin, supra note 16, at 262 (summarizing this view).
26 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court declared that
[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within
the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, wel-
fare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense
of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere
charity, but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' The same governmental inter-
ests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted
provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are
indispensable to that end.
Id. at 265. Thus Goldberg forms a central part of the standard story. See Simon, supra
note 15, at 3.
27 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 289-90 (3d ed. 1992). This
leading casebook suggests that if the standard story is accurate, "[p]rograms that were
generally viewed as paternalistic, discretionary, and individualized have been transformed
into adversarial, impersonal, property-rights regimes.' Id. at 290. Sosin argues that the
attack on discretion exemplified by Goldberg stemmed from the 'legal rights view" that
discretion was undesirable because it could be abused. See Sosin, supra note 16, at
261-62. Sosin disagrees with the standard account, however, in that he attributes the
depersonalization of the welfare bureaucracy to economic conditions rather than the
victory of this 'legal rights view.' See id. at 279.
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objective and routinized criteria and policies "led to the realization
that well-trained or professionalized social welfare workers were no
longer needed. "28 Clerks replaced trained professionals.29 As the
Director of Labor Relations of the Massachusetts welfare department
explained in the early 1980s: "'We've been trying to get the peo-
ple who think like social workers out and the people who think like
bank tellers in."' 30 The system of proving eligibility became docu-
ment-based,31 and "voluminous" policy manuals replaced informal
standards. 2 Far from fostering a more accountable welfare system,
Goldberg created a depersonalized bureaucracy. Several scholars
point to Goldberg as the birth of a legalistic approach to welfare
eligibility determinations.3
The standard story is not quite accurate. Goldberg was limited
in scope quite soon after it was decided. 4 Furthermore, Goldberg
2" MASHAW, supra note 27, at 289-90; see also DANIEL J. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY
AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE 16-22 (1974); Simon, supra note 15, at 1215.
' Sosin explains: "Their primary interests were in meeting rules, filling out forms,
and taking deadlines into account, not in dispensing social services or referring clients to
service workers.' Sosin, supra note 16, at 275.
30 Simon, supra note 15, at 1216.
3' See Simon, supra note 15, at 1205-06.
32 See Simon, supra note 15, at 1201.
31 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 15, at 1230-33. At the time, however, advocates for
the poor were optimistic about the use of litigation to bring about improvements in the
welfare system. See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 21, at 306-14.
A similar line of reasoning contends that efforts to change the welfare system
through litigation are unlikely to succeed. As one scholar suggests, "The inadequacy of
liberal legalism is that it has tried to either stamp out discretion or control it through
the adversarial assertion of legal rights . . . ." Handler, supra note 16, at 1277. Handler
argues for a mixed system in which several areas of policy are left to discretionary
determinations. See id. at 1279. The transformation of the welfare system, on this ac-
count, reflects less the impact of a single case and more the cumulative effects of a
litigation strategy. Even where litigation has been successful, the bureaucracy responds
by imposing new hurdles and obstacles. See Gary L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Ad-
dressing Bureaucratic Disentitlement, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 591, 599 (1987-
88).
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (allowing termination of SSI
benefits pending the outcome of fair evidentiary hearing); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535 (1972) (allowing states to fund AFDC below standard of need); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (same); see also Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political
Spectacle': The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social
Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 900 (1990) (describing 'short-lived" triumph of
Goldberg).
Conversely, Goldberg was not the only significant decision protecting the rights of
the poor. As Alan Houseman explains, "Prior to King [v. Smith], the AFDC program was
viewed by both state and federal administrators as a program that provided vast state
discretion and imposed few federal requirements to which the states had to adhere."
[Vol. 64: 1
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hardly explains the decline in social work professionalism: the
overall qualifications of welfare workers were clearly in decline
before 1971." Equally important to the development of the wel-
fare bureaucracy was the evolution in social attitudes: "Social
work ... came to be associated on the left with invasion of privacy
and conformist manipulation and on the right with bleeding heart
sentimentality and administrative laxity."3" Yet while it is too easy
to overstate the unintended consequences of Goldberg, the legalistic
insistence on standards and policies lends itself to mechanical,
routinized processing of individual benefit cases. A personalized
system of welfare provision has distinct advantages and drawbacks:
a caseworker who is personally familiar with a client's case could
be of invaluable assistance in helping the client meet his or her
needs, but by the same token the client's privacy would be dimin-
ished. Once the caseworker loses discretion, the client may be able
to better protect his or her privacy but at the cost of dealing with
personnel who know little about his or her case and care even less.
As the next Section suggests, this administrative callousness has
rather unfortunate consequences.
B. The Dissuasion Function of Welfare Bureaucracies
1. Churning
One consequence of the rise of impersonal, mechanical benefit
systems is the phenomenon known as "churning," the effort to re-
duce welfare rolls through burdensome or repetitive administrative
eligibility procedures. 7 This process attempts to weed out current
Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the
1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 831, 831 (1990).
11 See Simon, supra note 15, at 1215 n.46 (noting that 57% of federal public assis-
tance personnel in 1950 had two or more years of graduate study in social work, but
24.9% had similar qualifications in 1960) (citing M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL
GRANTS: PUBUC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 159 (1970); and U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, BUREAU OF FAMILY Svcs. & CHILDREN'S BUREAU, PUBUC SOCIAL WELFARE
PERSONNEL-1960, at 86 (1962)).
36 Simon, supra note 15, at 1215.
"' The New York City Human Resources Administration apparently coined the term
in 1973 to describe cases that are closed purely for administrative reasons. See Anna
Lou Dehavenon, Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New
York City's Public Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 231, 234
n.14 (1989-90). Bennett defines "churning' as 'the rapid administrative closure of welfare
cases, usually as a result of the recipient's inability to comply with a request for verifi-
1998]
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or potential welfare recipients by placing administrative hoops and
hurdles in the way of a successful application. Many claimants
either become discouraged and decide it is not worth their while to
apply, or they inevitably run afoul of some requirement or another,
causing them to become ineligible. 8 Of course, policymakers do
not expressly state that their aim is to wear down recipients through
administrative attrition; instead, churning procedures are justified in
terms of evaluating eligibility, insuring that only "deserving" candi-
dates receive welfare, and preventing fraud. 9 Whatever the specif-
ic justification, the depersonalized, document-based system of wel-
fare eligibility determination expanded the role for "bureaucratic
disentitlement."4" Welfare recipients and applicants could be de-
nied for their failure to satisfy any one of innumerable verification
and documentation requirements. 41 Such disentitlement is the re-
sult of management procedures and efficiency concerns, rather than
determinations of need or desert.42
Churning consists not only of front-line welfare officials en-
gaged in verification extremism, but also high-level bureaucrats
setting policy goals whose utility is far outweighed by their churn-
ing potential. While feeding the needy may seem an unquestionably
valid goal of welfare policy, federal policymakers have frequently
intervened to make it difficult to get Food Stamps. For example,
Monthly Reporting and Retrospective Budgeting ("MRRB") proce-
dures were a mandatory feature of federal Food Stamp policy from
1981 through 1988.41 Under MRRB, recipients had to visit the lo-
cation of eligibility or failure to arrive at a scheduled appointment with the intake case-
worker or to meet some other deadline.' Bennett, supra note 15, at 2180-81. For a dis-
cussion of this practice before 1970, see PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 21, at 149-61.
' Far from taking unqualified people off the rolls, churning usually eliminates recipi-
ents who are qualified but for their adherence to some administrative requirement or
another. For a comparative analysis that shows a very close relationship between admin-
istrative case closings and case reopenings, see Dehavenon, supra note 37, at 239.
" Bennett concurs: "Of the three insatiable external demands with which welfare
offices cope through 'neutral,' internal adjustments, external demands for fraud control
measures are the most disruptive.' Bennett, supra note 15, at 2194-95.
4 Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc.
SERV. REv. 3 (1984).
41 Susan Bennett has written extensively about such verification extremism" that
causes single mothers to lose benefits for the failure to prove that the children were
theirs or to notarize their homelessness. See Bennett, supra note 15, at 2164-71. Bennett
defines this term as "[flixations on the form of proof of eligibility.' Id. at 2164; see also
Michael Lipsky & Marc A. Thibodeau, Domestic Food Policy in the United States, 15 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 319, 330 (1990) (discussing verification extremism).
4 See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 330.
4' The general consensus is that the welter of Food Stamp administrative require-
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cal welfare office every month to go over their household bud-
gets.44 Needless to say, monthly budget reporting makes compli-
ance with Food Stamp regulations extremely difficult: even if recipi-
ents manage to attend every single meeting, itself an onerous task,
the failure to provide documentation of any minor change in their
life circumstances could lead to loss of benefits." While the puta-
tive purpose of MRRB was to insure the accuracy of budgetary in-
formation, MRRB failed to save money in terms of program costs.46
Instead, it increased administrative closings and caused otherwise
eligible recipients to be cut off, a classic feature of churning.47 In
this harsh post-PRWORA climate, it would be quite easy for the
state to return to the days of the MRRB and require Food Stamp
recipients to arrange a visit to the welfare office, endure intermi-
nable delays and reschedulings, arrange for child care for these
eventualities, and change their work program schedules to be recer-
ments is primarily responsible for the relatively low number of households on Food
Stamps: only 43.8% of all eligible households. See Karen Terhune, Comment, Reforma-
tion of the Food Stamp Act: Abating Domestic Hunger Means Resisting 'Legislative Junk
Food', 41 CAl-. U. L. REV. 421, 437-38 (1992). One reason for this low figure are the
federal accounting rules adopted in 1973, known as Quality Control, which encouraged
states to adopt extreme verification requirements. See Dehavenon, supra note 37, at 245.
There were 'modest reforms' in the Food Stamp Quality Control regulations in 1988.
See Dehavenon, supra note 37, at 251 & n.95. As part of these reforms, states were
penalized for overpayments of Food Stamps, but not underpayments. See Lipsky &
Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 329-30; Terhune, supra, at 434. Lipsky and Thibodeau also
note the blizzard of changes in the Food Stamp program during this period. During one
thirty-month period in the 1980s, the Food and Nutrition Service implemented ninety
.major regulatory changes.' Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 330 n.27. One can
only imagine how difficult it would be for an individual benefit recipient, particularly a
single working mother or an elderly retiree, to keep up with these changes.
I See Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-435, § 204(b) (amending
7 U.S.C. § 2015(c) (1982)) (allowing optional monthly administration of MRRB). In
Connecticut, state regulations allow the welfare department to certify the recipient for
anywhere from one to twelve months. See CONN. UNIF. POL'Y MANUAL
§ 1545.10(B)(1)(e), P-1545.05(2).
s See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 330.
4 See Terhune, supra note 43, at 440 n.124 (citing studies).
41 See Terhune, supra note 43, at 440 n.124 ("[M]onthly reporting adds to adminis-
trative costs, ... can lead to termination of benefits for recipients who are otherwise
eligible, and . . . results in a substantial amount of case closures followed by case
reopenings (or 'churning').") (quoting ROBERT GREENSTEIN & MARION E. NICHOLS, CENTER
FOR BUDGET AND POUCY PRIORITIES, MONTHLY REPORTING: A REvIEw OF THE RESEARCH
FINDINGS 33-35 (1989)).
Every year, individuals across the country are cut off welfare because they fail to
attend their recertification. One New York study found that 43% of families who lost
their Food Stamp benefits did so because they missed their recertification interviews. See
Dehavenon, supra note 37, at 248.
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tified each month. With each additional administrative requirement
comes another possibility that that recipient will fail to meet some
requirement or another, or the caseworker will make an error, and
benefits will be terminated for reasons unrelated to need.
The courts have proven largely unreceptive to the claim that
churning violates due process or equal protection. In Boddie v.
Connecticut, the Supreme Court noted that there may be a case
where administrative action would be "the equivalent of denying
[individuals] an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed
right . . . , and, in the absence of a sufficient countervailing justifi-
cation for the State's action, a denial of due process."48 However,
the lower courts have applied Boddie largely in the context of court
filing fees, rather than broadening the scope of this prohibition to
include churning by welfare agencies. For example, litigants at-
tacked several churning mechanisms in the 1976 case Perez v.
Lavine: first, prescreening applicants based on criteria that were
never made known to them; second, the long lines that poor staff-
ing and management produced outside the welfare center; third, the
practice of closing the doors of the center once staff had met their
daily quotas; and fourth, accepting applications only after a formal
interview.49 These hoops and hurdles to completing a mere appli-
cation for benefits suggests that the agency was at the very least
involved in a passive form of application dissuasion. The court,
however, dismissed these claims,5" concluding that,
A minimum of compassion and the slightest penchant for efficiency would
lead one to deplore the onerous conditions existing at many of the wel-
fare centers, but this alone is insufficient for the Court to conclude that
the congestion itself is such a deterrence to interested individuals as to
amount to a denial of their opportunity to apply for public assis-
tance ......
In short, even the most limited opportunity to apply for benefits will
suffice. The failure of the federal courts to monitor agency churning
practices allows welfare officials to deny relief on an arbitrary basis.
401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1970).
4 See 412 F. Supp. 1340, 1346-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
s See id. at 1349-56.
s, Id. at 1351.
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2. Churning in Action
In 1995, New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani introduced a
dramatic effort to reduce welfare rolls known as eligibility verifica-
tion review, or EVR. s2 One legal services lawyer called EVR "'the
most aggressive effort to deny public assistance I've seen in my 20
years in this business."'5 3 In addition to the systemic barriers of
five-hour waits, undersupplied offices, and unresponsive person-
nel, 4 the EVR process imposed two additional hurdles upon the
receipt of welfare. First, all applicants, regardless of their borough of
residence, were required to report to a special center in Brooklyn
for an additional eligibility interview. The second step to EVR was
an unannounced home visit to confirm that the applicant had pro-
vided correct information as to residence and family composi-
tion. s The home visits followed preexisting, but irregularly used,
verification procedures titled "Front End Detection Service."56
52 For a basic description of EVR, see David Firestone, 100,000 New Yorkers May
Be Cut Off Welfare in Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at B1; Kimberly J.
McLarin, City Sued Over Program to Curb Welfare Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1995,
§ 1, at 31; Kimberly J. McLarin, Poor See New Indignity in Welfare Fraud War, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at Al. See also Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empiri-
cal Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y
5, 82-83 (1996) (*EVR is a process that gathers no new information, contributes nothing
substantive to the determinations of eligibility, but serves purely and simply as another
obstacle to prevent poor people from obtaining what paltry assistance our society affords
them.').
A complete description of the effects of EVR is presented in McKeon v. Giuliani,
No. 95-10990, at 11 28-32 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1995) (Order to Show Cause for Prelimi-
nary Injunction and Class Certification with Temporary Restraining Order) [hereinafter
McKeon]. Following the passage of the PRWORA, as well as concessions by the city
welfare department, the McKeon lawsuit was withdrawn. Although the McKeon suit did
not put a halt to EVR, a New York Supreme Court recently struck down the require-
ments of EVR as applied to AIDS services clients. See Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1998, at 26.
Even Medicaid recipients are subject to home visits. In one case, reminiscent of
the days of the "man in the house' rule, a woman and her children were denied Medi-
caid because inspectors found a single pair of jeans in the mother's closet. They insist-
ed that the jeans belonged to a cohabitating male. See Nina Berstein, New Hurdle for
Some Seeking Medicaid: Home Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998, §1, at 43.
11 Firestone, supra note 52, at B1 (quoting Legal Services for New York City lawyer
Don Friedman).
I See McLarin, Poor See New Indignity in Welfare Fraud War, supra note 52, at Al
(describing such conditions).
11 For a description of these new requirements, see sources cited supra note 52.
See N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 351.4, 387.8(c) (1998) (home visits
for Food Stamp recipients); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 134(b) (McKinney 1992) (home visits
for public assistance recipients).
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Hence investigators, calling themselves "FEDS," 7 would show up
at the recipient's home and interrogate landlords and neighbors if
the recipient was not there.
Those interviewed by EVR workers stated that the workers were
"'belligerent"' and "'intimidating.'" s8 The interviewers wore badges
even though they were not police officers. 9 One applicant report-
ed that his address book was pulled from his hands by an EVR
worker when he could not provide an address. The applicant was
forced to sign a form in English even though he only spoke Spanish;
later it turned out he had unwittingly signed a form withdrawing his
application for relief.60
The home visit stage saw further abuses even apart from case-
workers posing as the "Feds." Cases were frequently closed simply
because there was nobody at home to answer the questions,6 or
because the forms slipped under the door by EVR investigators
failed to give instructions in any language but English.62 In one
incident, an individual's case was closed because she was not pres-
ent when the EVR investigators dropped by her house; she was out
at the work program assigned to her by the very same welfare
agency.63
Although the asserted justification for EVR is fraud prevention,
the number of proven cases of fraud paled in comparison to the
number of cases of administrative harassment and frustration.64
Robert Marquez, the Queens administrator for Catholic Charities,
explained: "'There are more and more delays for people applying
for public benefits. You see a three, four, five-month delay.' 6
s See McKeon, supra note 52, at 11 72-80.
s Paul Schwartzman, City Welfare Suit Advocates Rip Screening Program, DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 30, 1995, at 12 (quoting applicant Edward DeLoatch).
s See McKeon, supra note 52, at 1 35.
60 See Patrick J. Horvath, Letter to the Editor, Has Harassment Become the Plan for
Reducing Welfare Rolls?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1995, at A16 (describing experience of
client); McKeon, supra note 52, at 132.
61 See McLarin, Poor See New Indignity in Welfare Fraud War, supra note 52, at
Al.
62 See Firestone, supra note 52, at B1 (describing the experience of a Russian immi-
grant who lost his benefits because he did not understand EVR forms).
See McKeon, supra note 52, at 1 60.
See Paul Moses, Desperate Queens Mother Gets Quick Offers of Aid, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), Dec. 14, 1995, at A6 (telling story of woman who waited four months for her
case to be processed as result of EVR).
65 Paul Moses, Stuck in Red Tape: As Holidays Approach, Cuts Leave Some Poor
Trapped in Bureaucracy, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 12, 1995, at AS.
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Bureaucratic inconsistency, arbitrariness, and cruelty were rampant.
One reporter found an applicant with two contradictory documents,
one cutting her benefits off for missing an EVR interview and a
second verifying that she had in fact made the interview.66 AIDS
patients who missed their EVR appointments had their benefits can-
celed even though the only reason they had missed their appoint-
ments was because they had been hospitalized.67
The protests of city officials notwithstanding, it was not difficult
to discern the motivation for New York City's harsh new approach
to welfare policy: the City sought to impose administrative hoops
and hurdles to reduce the number of individuals on welfare. As one
applicant, a flood victim seeking an emergency grant, complained,
"'It's the running around that gets to you."'68 A report by the City's
Public Advocate found that "improper and illegal treatment of appli-
cants and recipients was commonplace" in the rush to close cas-
es.69 Opponents of the policy leaked a memo written by a Human
Resources Administration official that baldly declared that the pro-
gram was "designed to alleviate the budget gap."70 An extensive
report on EVR a year and a half after its implementation found that
its overly rigorous procedures denied thousands of eligible people
the benefits to which they were entitled. 1
To some degree, EVR has reduced the number of welfare recip-
ients. In its first year, the number of Home Relief recipients in New
York City dropped from 244,000 to 179,000,72 and other states
seem interested in following Mayor Giuliani's lead.73 However, the
See id.
67 See Denene Miller, Welfare Flap Over AIDS Patients, DAILY NEws, Nov. 16,
1995, at 38. At a City Council hearing on the subject, Councilman Tom Duane pro-
duced an internal memo that directed EVR workers not to call caseworkers in the Divi-
sion of AIDS Services if AIDS patients missed their appointments. See id.
6 Claire Serant, Flood Victims in Bureaucratic Sea, DAILY NEwS, Nov. 4, 1996, Sub-
urban Section, at 1.
69 Firestone, supra note 52, at B1. City officials asserted that the low number of Fair
Hearing requests filed against EVR closings suggests that the program is generally satis-
factory to recipients. On the other hand, simply reapplying may reestablish benefits faster
than going through the hearing process. See Dehavenon, supra note 37, at 243. In my
own experience assisting clients in this process, informal negotiation with EVR officials
often proved to be the fastest way to solve the problem of unwarranted cut-offs.
"o Paul Moses, City Accused of Welfare Scare Tactics, NEwSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 16,
1995, at A24.
11 See Lynette Holloway, Report Says Errors, Not Fraud, Are the Biggest Reason
New York City Cuts Off Welfare, N.Y. TMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at B3.
72 See McLarin, City Sued Over Program to Curb Welfare Fraud, supra note 52, at
31.
73 Connecticut has recently adopted legislation that would allow the creation of an
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use of criteria wholly unrelated to need is an ominous development
in the context of increased state discretion to run their own relief
systems. Moreover, private corporations have a strong interest in
churning policies; not only does churning allow the private provider
to claim that it has processed a high number of cases, but the puta-
tively neutral churning criteria also screen out deserving claimants
and thereby maximize private profits.
3. The Human Costs of Administrative Dissuasion
Churning applicants is not merely an unfortunate side effect of
the welfare system: it is one of its primary goals. As one Los Angel-
es County welfare official declared: "'[The] welfare application pro-
cess.., was designed to be rough. It is designed quite frankly to be
exclusionary." 74 Policymakers implement churning procedures to
force exclusion among eligible recipients.7 It could be argued that
all welfare policies cause some amount of exclusion: no matter
how valid or reasonable the requirement, somebody will always
drop out rather than comply. Yet whether welfare recipients should
be compelled to get jobs, to have fewer children, or to attend train-
ing sessions are all value questions; these questions all merit debate
and discussion. There are few values inherent to churning, howev-
er, apart from cost-effectiveness76 and ensuring that only those who
early fraud detection system. See 1995 Conn. Acts 194, § 25 (Reg. Sess.). Florida has
developed a similar system as well. See Annmarie Sarsfield, Program Making Dent in
Welfare Fraud, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1.
74 Quoted in Blasi, supra note 33, at 596 (citation omitted); see also Rachel L.
Swains, New York's New Strategy Cuts Welfare Applications at Two Offices, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1998, at A18 (noting that policy manual defines the 'primary goal' of welfare
office as to 'divertol people from applying for public assistance . . .).
s Churning is not caused solely by welfare workers on the understaffed front lines;
it is part of the overall policy of administrative agencies. See Bennett, supra note 15, at
2160 ("Not all manifestations of discouragement are the result of decisions by individual
line workers. Many are the consequence of higher-level government decisions about re-
lief policy.'). For this reason, attacking individual caseworkers for rudeness or insensitivi-
ty is not a complete strategy for reform.
76 Policymakers turn to churning mechanisms largely to effectuate budget cuts. See
Bennett, supra note 15, at 2199. However, the cost of churning may outweigh its bene-
fits. Implementing and monitoring additional requirements demands more personnel and
resources, thereby mandating expenditures that might not be worth it in the long run.
EVR, for example, came with a price tag of between $40 and $50 million. See
Firestone, supra note 52, at B1. The net savings, however, are projected at $200 mil-
lion, see id., but it is difficult to assess the validity of this estimate. Monthly Food
Stamp budgeting sessions with recipients failed to save money in terms of program costs.
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illogically persevere receive assistance.
Churning policies often reward recipients whose skills consist
of managing to attend meetings and playing the system rather than
endeavoring to lift themselves out of poverty. Satisfying the vast
number of administrative obligations imposed by EVR, for example,
seems to require a life of leisure. Such policies may have the para-
doxical effect of hindering recipients' search for employment or
efforts to take care of their children. Similarly, work requirements
are selection devices of questionable validity when there are few
employment opportunities.77 In a critique of the Food Stamp pro-
gram, one study noted that churning policies had the effect of scree-
ning out those traditionally considered most "deserving" of assis-
tance: bureaucratic burdens fell especially hard on elderly recipi-
ents, who found it difficult to make all the required appointments.-
" If the aim of public assistance is to assist the neediest or those
most committed to improving their situation, churning policies fail
to satisfy these goals.
A final reason why churning is counterproductive is that it
stigmatizes recipients even while other welfare policies seek to
integrate benefit recipients into the social mainstream.79 The gov-
ernment takes a far greater risk on graduate student loans, for exam-
ple, than on any welfare recipient.8" In light of this risk, "[welfare
fraud] is not too different from the 'fraud' committed by those col-
lecting unemployment insurance who fail to report occasional in-
come, or those who 'forget' to report earnings on their income tax
forms."81 The argument that it is essential to impose additional "an-
See Terhune, supra note 43, at 440 n.124 (citing studies).
" See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 331.
78 See Lipsky & Thibodeau, supra note 41, at 331.
7 Social mainstreaming is a major argument behind work requirements: through
work, recipients will be inculcated with the "proper" attitudes needed for success in the
job world. See Jason DeParle, Better Work Than Welfare-But What if There's Neither?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
80 As one commentator notes:
[Firaud is a fact of life at every point where public and govemment intersect,
and we don't hear the Governor and the Mayor calling for universal anti-fraud
fingerprinting. Doctors and dentists are not fingerprinted to combat health
insurance swindling. College graduates who received govemment school loans
are not fingerprinted, even though they are notoriously lax about repaying the
loans. No, it is the poor who are singled out.
David Jones, Letter to the Editor, Fingerprinting As Political Posturing, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1994, § 14, at 17.
" Ruth Brandwein, It's Folly to Fingerprint Welfare Clients, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug.
31, 1993, at 82.
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ti-fraud" requirements on welfare recipients is particularly galling as
terminally sloppy welfare agencies barely try to combat fraud, with
the information they already have, such as names and social
security numbers.82
Even apart from churning policies that have a patina of criminal
law enforcement, the arbitrary and erratic enforcement of even
mundane administrative welfare regulations places the poor outside
the realm of due process. One analyst describes the logic behind
bureaucratic disentitlement as follows: "'Besiege the families with
red tape. Find and use every opportunity to tell the parents, espe-
cially the mothers, that they are inferior human beings ....
Change the rules several times a year. Keep the rule changes com-
plex and quasi-secret, so they can't 'comply' . . . Wonder why
they don't like you." 8 Practices that humiliate and discourage
those in need work at cross-purposes with other, more laudable
welfare policies which seek to enable the poor to improve their
situation. If a public agency fails to serve the needs of the poor,
even though its mandate is to do so, it would be naive to expect
more of a private corporation whose primary duty is to its
shareholders.
82 In a major welfare fraud case, Federal District Judge Jack Weinstein noted that the
fraud had occurred first, because those fraudulently receiving welfare had friends or
bribed workers at the relevant offices to help them commit fraud and second, that no-
body at the agency had simply bothered to see if the Social Security number provided
by the claimant even existed. See United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262,
1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Judge Weinstein called the agency's efforts to combat fraud 'lack-
adaisical." Id. at 1270-71.
Efforts to combat "welfare fraud" frequently focus on potentially illegal behavior
among recipients rather than on providers or welfare caseworkers. See John Sullivan, 90
Are Charged in Welfare Fraud Schemes, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A24; John
Sullivan, 100 Accused in Fraud Case Over Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1995, at B1.
Persistent focus in the press on welfare fraud over other kinds of fraud also reinforces
racial stereotypes. See Erik Kolbert, Letter to the Editor, Upper-Class Cheating, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A14 (attacking Times for running article on welfare fraud com-
mitted by the lower class in Brooklyn and suggesting article on tax fraud committed by
middle and upper class in Manhattan).
83 Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
'Reform," 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 783 n.183 (1993) (quoting THERESA FUNICIELLO,
TYRANNY OF KINDNESS 311-12 (1993)). As one applicant described his treatment at the
hands of EVR: "'I was treated like an outcast, a criminal ... it was a humiliating feel-
ing, almost inhuman." McLarin, City Sued Over Program to Curb Welfare Fraud, supra
note 52, at 31 (quoting recipient Edward DeLoatch).
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C. The Ambiguous Promise of Technology
For the late 1980s and early 1990s, the picture of a vast, imper-
sonal welfare bureaucracy that denied individual rights through
repetitive, meaningless application requirements was largely accu-
rate.84 This system was a constant source of anger, frustration, and
desperation for benefit recipients. Claimants dealt with caseworkers
who could barely recall their names, much less their circumstances.
On the other hand, the apparent carelessness of welfare casework-
ers meant that benefit provision was not as intrusive as it was in the
days of the "man in the house" rule.85
Technology, however, promises to transform the welfare sys-
tem. Advocates of mass technological innovation promise foolproof
fraud prevention mechanisms, accurate and uniform distribution of
benefits through EBT systems, and faster and easier procedures to
claim benefits.86 The next Part sets forth many reasons to be skepti-
cal of these promises, but for present purposes, the critical point is
that technological innovation will allow welfare caseworkers to be
both impersonal and invasive. Keeping close tabs on benefit recipi-
ents is quite difficult for a caseworker who has to manage the flow
of thousands of pieces of paper concerning hundreds of different
cases. It is far easier to monitor behavior if she need only call up a
file that tracks the use of an EBT transfer card, much as a customer
assistance clerk can call up your credit card account. A great deal
has been written about how information gleaned from magazine
subscriptions, credit card reports, and Internet purchases can be
This conclusion is based in part on my own experience working with benefit
recipients in New York City and Connecticut, particularly with assisting clients through
New York City's EVR program. Accounts of such experiences similar to mine include
Bennett, supra note 15, and Dehavenon, supra note 37.
"I A significant exception to this generalization is EVR, as well as other fraud pre-
vention programs around the country. It could be argued, however, that these new fraud
prevention programs are a response to the lax administration of the past, thus proving
the general point that welfare bureaucracies had become sloppy and ineffectively man-
aged by the 1990s.
86 Unfortunately, the major advocate of these technologies is the federal government.
Once the government's role evolves from watchdog to cheerleader, it is fair to ask:
'Who is left to inform consumers of the risks and other costs?' Mark E. Budnitz, Elec-
tronic Money in the 1990s: A Net Benefit or Merely a Trade-Off?, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
747, 748 (1993).
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used to construct a frighteningly accurate picture of who we are.87
If the EBT card becomes the currency of the welfare state, a small
piece of plastic is poised to do what floors of bureaucrats could not.
Because of these technological advances, welfare policy has
evolved in a direction unanticipated by poverty law scholarship.
Rather than continue the trend toward less individualized and less
personal benefit provision, welfare bureaucracies could soon com-
mand highly personal, even intimate, information about recipients.
This informational advantage is gained, moreover, at a time when
pressures to cut costs have never been greater. The following Part
will survey three important developments of the 1990s that promise
to transform the welfare system: the devolution of authority from the
federal government to the states; the privatization of welfare provi-
sion; and the increasing use of technological systems to operate
welfare bureaucracies.
II. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF WELFARE REFORM
Since the passage of the PRWORA, welfare reform in the states
has taken discernible shape. While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to assess whether the overall policy shift has benefitted or
harmed the poor, this Part will focus on three highly significant
developments that have changed the fundamental rights of benefit
recipients: first, the devolution of authority to operate welfare pro-
grams from the federal government to the states; second, the in-
creased reliance on private corporations to deliver social services;
and third, the use of new technologies to deliver or deny services.
Not surprisingly, advocates for the poor contend that all three trends
have had negative effects. Less obvious, but equally important, is
that, upon closer analysis, the benefits of these trends fail to materi-
87 Several commentators have noted, with alarm, the ease with which private compa-
nies are able to gather personal data. In a recent column, Patricia Williams noted that
aggressive marketing and consumer information collection practices stem from 'the use
of computer technology to track individual tastes as unerringly as a bloodhound.' Patri-
cia Williams, Desire and Design, THE NATION, Dec. 15, 1997, at 10; see also Robert
O'Harrow Jr., Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at Al (dis-
cussing data collection by private firms); Margaret Webb Pressler, They've Got Your
Numbers: Data-Minded Catalogue Firms Know How to Zero in on Buyers, WASH. POST,
Dec. 7, 1997, at Al (discussing vast amount of information on individual purchasing
activity possessed by catalogue merchants); William Safire, Nobody's Business, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1998, at A27 (denouncing the threat to privacy posed by data surveil-
lance).
[Vol. 64: 1
DUE PROCESS IN A PRIVATIZED WELFARE SYSTEM
alize. Changing to a computerized system of benefit distribution, or
to a defederalized welfare policy, or to privatized social services,
exchanges one set of problems for another. As the following sec-
tions will explain, it is unclear whether these dramatic changes have
even addressed the concerns they purport to solve. State govern-
ments have frequently bypassed the tough questions in their rush to
experiment.88
A. The New(er) Federalism
Control over welfare policy has long teetered back and forth
between the states and the federal government. Indeed, "[b]attles
over federalism form a key part of more generalized battles over
social welfare policies in the United States."89 In the early.1970s,
President Richard M. Nixon sought to implement what he called
"The New Federalism," through which the states would enjoy more
latitude over welfare policy.9° In the 1980s, President Ronald Rea-
gan made a similar pledge to reduce the size of the federal govern-
ment and restore authority to the states, although in practice he
accomplished the opposite.91 The devolution of welfare policy in
the 1990s was largely the product of the 1994 midterm elections, in
which the Democratic party lost control of the House of Representa-
8 As one commentator, while critically surveying the Texas proposal to privatize
welfare, asked:
Is such an arrangement legal? Will the objectives of the programs, funded in
whole or in part with federal tax dollars, be served? Will costs be reduced or
increased? Will client confidentiality be safeguarded? Will corruption, an en-
demic problem in contracting, infect operations and expose government and
taxpayers to financial liability? Given the radical changes in welfare already
legislated, is this a good time to blaze new trails? And has the way in which
Texas has gone about this exercise allowed for the most careful, substantive
and democratic evaluation?
Sawicky, supra note 5, at 21.
89 MARMOR ET AL, supra note 10, at 46.
90 As Nixon proclaimed, "It is time for a New Federalism in which power, funds,
and responsibility will flow from Washington to the states and to the people." Quoted
in Scheiber, supra note 8, at 288; see also Helene Slessarev, Racial Tensions and Insti-
tutional Support: Social Programs During a Period of Retrenchment, in THE POLTICS OF
SOCIAL POuCY IN THE UNITED STATES 357, 378 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988). In retro-
spect, Nixon's welfare policies are quite surprising in light of his conservative Republi-
canism. Nixon is the only President who ever proposed a guaranteed annual minimum
income. See Charles V. Hamilton & Dona C. Hamilton, Social Policies, Civil Rights, and
Poverty, in FIGHTING POVERTY, supra note 15, at 303-05.
9' See Scheiber, supra note 8, at 290-94.
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tives for the first time in forty years, while the Republican party
consolidated its majority in the Senate. Despite the fervent states'
rights rhetoric that these Republicans brought to Congress, their
commitment to devolution extended only so far as was conducive
to their ideological goals.92 One such goal was to dismantle the
welfare state. 3
While welfare reform occupied a prominent place on the politi-
cal agenda for several decades, 1996 marked a truly historic mo-
ment: the abolition of the federal entitlement to assistance which
was at the heart of the New Deal.94 The legislation that took this
step was the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Recon-
ciliation Act,95 signed into law by President Clinton in the heat of
the 1996 campaign. Castigated as "the worst thing he has ever
done" by a former Health and Human Services official, 6 the
PRWORA was the logical result of Clinton's 1992 campaign prom-
ise to "end welfare as we know it."97 The PRWORA did not inau-
92 For example, a perennial favorite of Congressional Republicans is "takings' legisla-
tion, which would abolish the federal jurisdictional requirements of ripeness and absten-
tion and allow a plaintiff to head straight into federal court. An effort to pass "takings'
legislation recently failed. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Halts Property Bill Backed
by G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at A13. Not only does this contradict the clear
language of the Fifth Amendment, which does not prohibit all takings but only those
effected without just compensation, but it also eliminates the role of state government,
from municipal boards to state courts, which have traditionally been the first avenue of
redress.
11 See Jason DeParle, Momentum Bbilds for Cutting Back Welfare System, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, § 1, at 1.
I For a sampling of the rhetoric that marked the passage of the PRWORA, see 142
CONG. REc. H9393(01) (daily ed. July 31, 1996); infra note 101. The PRWORA recon-
figured other relationships as well. For an argument that this federal entitlement precedes
even the New Deal, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POUT-
ICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1996) (discussing origins of welfare
state in mothers' and soldiers' pensions in early twentieth century, rather than during
New Deal).
11 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
' Peter Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, 43 ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10090554. Edelman and Mary Jo Bane, another
Assistant Secretary at the Department of Health and Human Services, resigned in protest
over the Act. See Joel F. Handler, 'Ending Welfare as We Know lt"--Wrong for Welfare,
Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1995); see also Alison Mitchell,
Two Clinton Aides Resign to Protest New Welfare Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1996, at
Al.A9 Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1994, at Al. As Clinton explained:
In a Clinton Administration, we're going to put an end to welfare as we know
it. . . . We'll give them all the help they need for up to two years. But after
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gurate an era of welfare reform; it dramatically acceded to the pres-
sure of varied and extensive reforms already underway among the
states.98 The PRWORA is most notable for its conclusive abolition
of any federal entitlement to assistance.99
Two years later, it is too soon to tell whether the PRWORA has
fundamentally changed the American welfare system.1" During
the debate in Congress, advocates for the poor maintained that the
PRWORA would only increase poverty and suffering, particularly
among children."' One major reason for these dire predictions
was the fear that sending block grants to the states with relatively
few strings attached would encourage a "race to the bottom" in
welfare policy.0 2 On this theory, states will compete against each
other to offer fewer benefits, so as to avoid becoming "welfare
magnets" for needy individuals." 3 States are still in the process of
that, if they're able to work, they'll have to take a job in the private sector,
or start earning their way through community service.
Id. (quoting Bill Clinton campaign promise from 1991).
" Many states had already begun experimenting with their welfare programs; both
the Clinton and Bush Administrations had routinely approved waivers to the AFDC pro-
gram to allow states wider latitude. See Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115
Waivers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & PO'VY REV. 8 (1994).
The PRWORA simply continues this trend. See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(a) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1998)) ("The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of
States . . .
" See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1998)) ("This
part shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any
State program funded under this part.").
10 This is a very difficult question to answer in any event. See Barbara Vobejda &
Judith Havemann, States' Welfare Data Disarray Clouds Analysis, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
1998, at Al ("Eighteen months after federal lawmakers dramatically changed the nation's
welfare program, it is becoming clear that the mass of data the government requires
states to collect is in such disarray that it is impossible to determine whether the law is
working.).
101 As Representative John Lewis (D-GA) charged, "How, how can any person of
faith, of conscience, vote for a bill that will put a million more kids into poverty?" 142
CONG. REc. H9392-01 (daily ed. July 31, 1996); see also id. at H9395 ("The Republi-
cans will throw two million people, children, into poverty, and my President will only
throw one million into poverty.") (statement of Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY)); id. at
H9407 ("[This deadly and Draconian piece of garbage ...will do nothing to reform
the conditions of poverty and unemployment suffered by our Nation's most vulnerable.")
(statement of Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL)); Nichola L. Marshall, The Welfare Reform Act
of 1996: Political Compromise or Panacea for Welfare Dependency?, 4 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 333, 341-43 (1997).
102 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federal-
ism: A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REVJYALE J. ON REG.
297, 306-13 (1996); Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice
Perspective, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1984 (1996).
10' See Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism of
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experimenting, and the courts have had little opportunity to weigh
in on the critical issues. A few months after the passage of the
PRWORA, a spate of lawsuits challenged several of its provisions,
particularly a provision allowing states to limit benefits to recipients
who had lived in that state less than one year.1°4 The PRWORA
even grants additional revenues to those states that are most suc-
cessful in trimming their rolls,"0 5 providing yet another incentive
to impose severe eligibility requirements. These unhealthy incen-
tives, moreover, are set in place against the backdrop of the general
failure of welfare policy to address the problem of declining work
opportunities."°
Yet as the next Section demonstrates, the real danger is not that
states will take it upon themselves to establish particularly miserly
benefit programs, but that they will wash their hands of all responsi-
bility for their neediest citizens. Although welfare reform was in-
tended to vindicate the rights of states to design and operate pro-
grams as they saw fit, many states have simply surrendered this
authority. All over the country, state governments are turning to
private corporations to run their welfare systems. The choice to do
so is not merely ironic, but also ill-considered.
B. Privatizing the Welfare State
Policymakers and legal scholars have paid a great deal of atten-
tion to the devolution of responsibility for the poor from the federal
government to the states. An equally important trend, however, is
the gradual accretion of power to private corporations to operate
welfare systems. This is a very serious development; in the context
of welfare services, the power to grant or deny benefits has coercive
force.'0 7 In the context of this Article, "privatization" refers to the
America's Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE L. & POi'Y REvJYAE J. ON REG.
123, 136 (1996).
" See Richard C. Reuben, The Welfare Challenge, 83 A.B.A.J., Jan. 1997, at 34.
This provision is almost certainly unconstitutional. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), the Supreme Court struck down state residency requirements that reduced
welfare payments to those who were newcomers to the state.
100 See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1) (1996) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 603(4)(3)
(1998)).
11 See Handler, supra note 16, at 1273-77. See generally WILLIAM Juuus WILSON,
WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
1"7 This power of coercion is generally the most controversial aspect of privatization
schemes. See David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J.
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privatization of state social services by for-profit entities. It does not
address provision of services by nonprofits." 8 The latter practice
raises fewer concerns regarding motive and efficacy; as I argue later,
the financial self-interest of decision-makers greatly affects the due
process rights of the poor. Moreover, as nonprofits have more expe-
rience in and commitment to serving needy populations, their role
is less problematic. °9
The PRWORA clearly envisions a major role for privatization in
the post-New Deal landscape. From the outset, its supporters sug-
gested that welfare reform would require a fundamental
reconception of the role of government. Florida Representative Clay
Shaw, a major architect of the PRWORA, argued that privatization is
"exactly what has to happen for welfare reform to work.""' The
PRWORA provides that a state can operate its welfare programs
"through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organiza-
tions.""' This policy is hardly a matter of principle. The
PRWORA, like most pieces of legislation, bore the earmarks of
extensive lobbying. Courtesy of Senator John Breaux of Louisiana,
the word "nonprofit" was dropped from the bill." 2 As one jour-
647, 648 (1986). Thus far, the privatization of welfare has engendered little debate in
legal scholarship. The few articles that address the issue do so peripherally. See, e.g.,
Julie A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. 1. REV. 993, 993-95
(1996) (noting issues raised by welfare privatization).
11 In many respects, a better word to describe the for-profit privatization on which
this Article focuses would be "profiteering.' Although this term is more accurate, it is
also far too perjorative.
" See, e.g., Lynette Holloway, Shelters Improve Under Private Groups, Raising a
New Worry, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1997, at B1. In the 1996 Republican primary race,
former Tennessee Govemor and Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander suggested al-
lowing taxpayers to direct their payments to the local charity of their choice. Although
widely assailed as an ill-conceived idea, this proposal would have facilitated the privat-
ization of welfare services by local nonprofits. Later on in the race, eventual Republican
candidate Bob Dole made an identical suggestion. See Goodman, supra note 11, at A18
(describing Dole plan and arguing for '501(c)(3)-plus" designation for particularly benefi-
cial charities). This idea has been acclaimed in some places. See Alan Finder, Some
Private Efforts See Success In Job Hunt for Those on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
1998, at Al; William Safire, . . . As We Know It, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 1995, at A21;
Cathy Young, Taking Privatized Welfare Seriously, DETRorr NEWs, Feb. 27, 1996.
11o Judith Havemann, Welfare Reform Leader Makes Corporate Move: Ex-Official Pre-
dicts Privately Run Programs, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1996, at A13.
"' Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)). Hence Florida
specifies that the state welfare department "shall enter into public-private contracts for all
provision of electronic transfer of public assistance benefits . . . . FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 409.942 (West 1997); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.33(B)(1) (Banks-Baldwin
1994 & Supp. 1998).
112 See Nina Bemstein, Profits From Poverty: Deletion of Word in Welfare Bill Opens
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nalist has documented, the deletion of this single word from the bill
has had significant consequences." '3 Before 1996, only nonprofit
orphanages were eligible for federal funds. Section 501 of the
PRWORA, however, grants authority to the states "to make foster
care maintenance payments on behalf of children in any private
child care institution,"'1 4 rather than any private nonprofit child
care institution. The chief lobbyist on this provision was Kenneth
M. Mazik, who runs a for-profit orphanage in Delaware. One inves-
tigation revealed that his orphanage's staff manual instructed person-
nel on using electric shock devices on children, that Mazik himself
openly beat a mentally retarded boy with a riding crop, and that
New York State investigators pulled all New York wards from the
orphanage in 1992 upon finding children held in physical restraints
in trailers that reeked of urine and feces."' In light of such facts, it
seems prudent to ask whether for-profit orphanages take proper care
of children before allowing a notorious offender to help write
federal welfare law.
The PRWORA opened the door to a number of large corpora-
tions adept at the art of pursuing federal largesse. Among the major
contenders, and perhaps the most improbable one, is defense con-
tractor Lockheed Martin, more accustomed to manufacturing weap-
ons of mass destruction than calculating family needs budgets.""
As of fall 1997, Lockheed had eleven contracts in three states; its
Florida contracts alone totaled $13 million." 7 A second major
player in these sweepstakes is Dallas-based Electronic Data Services
(EDS). EDS first rose to national prominence as the cash cow of H.
Ross Perot, the eccentric Texan who intermittently ran for President
in 1992 and 1996. Perot's efforts to portray himself as a capitalist
colossus succeeded in spite of the fact that he amassed a large part
Foster Care to Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, § 1, at 1.
113 See id.
,,4 Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 501 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 672(c) (1998)).
"s See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 1.
116 Jeff Kunerth, Lockheed Takes on Welfare; A Division of Defense Giant Lockheed
Martin is Snapping up Contracts in the Move Toward Privatizing Welfare, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 7, 1997, at H1 ('There are big bucks in helping poor people, and
Lockheed Martin Corp. is leading a pack of large corporations going after million-dollar
contracts to provide services to welfare recipients."). Ironically, Lockheed was the origi-
nal "corporate welfare' recipient. Senator William Proxmire coined the term in 1971
when the federal government bailed out Lockheed to the tune of $250 million. See
William D. Hartung & Jennifer Washburn, Lockheed Martin: From Welfare to Welfare,
THE NATION, Mar. 2, 1998.
1,7 See Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1.
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of his fortune overnight by selling EDS, which processed Medi-
care/Medicaid reimbursement claims." 8 These corporations, and
others, have spared little time and expense in the race to privatize
social services. As William D. Eggers, of the libertarian Reason
Foundation, recently urged attendees at a conference on the sub-
ject, welfare privatization is now "'probably the hottest area [of
privatization] in the country."'. 9 A brochure touting the confer-
ence exhorted companies to: "'Capitalize on the massive growth
potential of the new world of welfare reform/Gain a leading edge in
the market while it is in its early stage/Profit from the opportunities
available.""2
Despite the radical tilt toward privatization, the debate over
welfare reform featured remarkably little discussion on the subject.
In part, this may reflect the fact that the central issue was the aboli-
tion of an entitlement to assistance. More likely, the goal of privat-
ization went hand-in-hand with the real purpose of welfare reform:
cutting costs. 2' Yet the view that the market inherently provides
services more cost-effectively, accepted as gospel in some quarters,
often proves false in this area of policy. Delegating service provision
to a private entity creates monitoring costs. "[C]ontracting out de-
mands exceptional knowledge and honesty on the part of politicians
and government bureaucrats: they must negotiate contracts that
defend the public interest, and they must monitor them careful-
ly.""'22 This assumes, moreover, that the private entity provides
benefits in a competent manner. The record suggests otherwise:
Unisys Corp.'s Statewide Automated Welfare System in California could
cost twice its 1995 bid price of $554 million. Andersen Consulting is four
years behind and $64 million over budget with its computerized child-
support enforcement system in Texas. Ohio canceled its job-placement
In his biography of Perot, Gerald Posner refers to Perot as a "welfare billionaire."
See GERALD POSNER, CmZEN PEROT: His LIFE AND TIMES 34 (1996).
"' Barbara Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Gold: How Corporations Seek to Profit
From Welfare Reform, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1997, at 46 [hereinafter Spinning the Poor
Into Gold].
110 Id. at 44.
21 As Don Winstead, head of Florida's WAGES (Work And Gain Economic Self-Suf-
ficiency) program, comments: "'The only way this works financially is that the cost to
government must go down because these tasks are being done by the private provid-
ers.'" Quoted in Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1.
"I Edward S. Herman, Privatization: Downsizing Government for Principle and Profit,
DOLLARS & SENSE, Mar. 1, 1997, at 10.
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contract with America Works after finding it was costing the state $24,000
per placement. Problems with an EDS auto-insurance claims system cost
New Jersey $50 million in uncollected premiums.123
The computerized child-support enforcement system Lockheed
promised California for $99 million in 1995 is now $205 million
over budget. 124 Tired of Andersen Consulting's cost overruns, the
Nebraska Department of Social Services withheld payment in Janu-
ary 1996.125 Virginia canceled a Medicaid contract with EDS
when performance ran twenty months late.126 EDS sold Florida a
faulty social services computer system that wound up costing the
state $260 million. Florida sued for damages of $60 million and an
order keeping EDS out of Florida for the foreseeable future. 127
Privatization also fosters its own kind of fraud. Although the
question of which private corporation administers which benefit
programs may seem unimportant, the process by which these bids
are made and won raises serious concerns about how the programs
will be administered. Corporate suitors court various state agencies
in an effort to improve their chances of receiving privatization
bids.'28 Gtech Corporation, the nation's largest operator of state
lotteries and the parent company of a firm under contract to ad-
minister Food Stamps in Texas, has been accused of bid-rigging and
influence-peddling.'29 Maximus allegedly paid a West Virginia
welfare administrator to give them the inside track in bidding for a
child welfare services contract.3 While Lockheed gave $1.3 mil-
I Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1.
124 See George Rodrigue, Problems Reported in Privatizing Welfare-Firms Seeking
Texas Contract Cite Successes, Though Most Have Had Troubles Elsewhere, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, May 17, 1997, at 1A.
125 See Elizabeth MacDonald, States Sour on Computer Consultants as Costs Swell,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1998, at A2.
126 See Rodrigue, supra note 124, at 1A.
'2 See Claiming Fraud, Florida Seeks to Bar EDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1995, at D6.
Florida subsequently sought to withdraw from alternative dispute resolution on the issue,
claiming fraud on the part of EDS. See State v. EDS, 664 So. 2d 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
"Io See, e.g., Harwood, supra note 7, at Al (noting improbable alliances between
Lockheed Martin and Texas Workforce Commission, and Electronic Data Systems and the
Texas welfare department); Totty, supra note 3, at T1 (same).
'2 See Lottery Supplier Gtech Will Trim Jobs, Sell Unit, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb.
28, 1998, at 1E; Brett Pulley, The Came Behind the Gaming: Charges of Gtech Miscon-
duct Fail to Shake Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1998, at DI.
130 See Nina Bernstein, Giant Companies Entering Race to Run State Welfare Pro-
grams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, § 1, at 1.
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lion to federal candidates and national parties in 1995-96,131 mon-
ey alone does not always do the trick. In Mississippi, Lockheed bid
$16 million for the right to operate the state network while Transac-
tive bid $450,000. Even though its bid was one-thirty-second of
Lockheed's, Transactive won.132 The revolving doors from public
to private employment also contribute to the appearance of
impropriety. 3 No sooner had Michigan's former welfare services
director helped draft and lobby for the PRWORA than he became a
lobbyist for Lockheed. 34 Finally, being the EBT provider has cer-
tain benefits. Relying on EBT as a financial foot in the door, "Mis-
souri hopes to lure welfare recipients into opening bank ac-
counts.""' Serving the needy thus becomes a means of expanding
private corporations' customer base. 36
The consequences of privatization, moreover, have completely
undercut the highly touted advantages of devolution, which theo-
retically was the impetus behind welfare reform. As in any major
industry, corporate welfare providers go bankrupt, acquire one
another, or split up. In early 1998, for example, Citibank EBT Ser-
vices announced that it would buy the EBT services provided by
Transactive, services that include Indiana, Illinois, Texas, and Sacra-
mento County, California. Because the move would make Citibank
the EBT vendor for thirty-three states, the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice has filed suit to prevent the
acquisition.'37 State officials were less than enthusiastic about the
proposed deal. As Raymond McCabe, Massachusetts's EBT coordi-
nator, complained, "'Where is the competition? Where is our ability
'1 See Harwood, supra note 7, at Al.
132 See Mississippi Battle Continues, EFT REP., Sept. 24, 1997, at 1.
133 One possible reason that Justice Department officials have grown more receptive
to the idea of privatizing prisons is that the representatives of the privatizing companies
include many of their former colleagues. See Jeff Gerth & Stephen Labaton, Prisons for
Profit: Jail Business Shows Its Weaknesses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1995, at Al.
11 See Havemann, supra note 110, at A13.
131 As EBT Nears, Mo. Pushes Poor to Open Bank Accounts, AM. BANKER, Aug. 1,
1997, at 13.
'16 Labor and community activists criticized the Treasury Department's implementation
of EBT, contending that, "People who are outside the financial mainstream will be
vulnerable to the abusive practices of fringe bankers who may enter into partnerships
with the banks to build up a captive customer base." Dean Anason, Electronic Benefits
Plan Called Unfair to Poor, AM. BANKER, Nov. 24, 1997, at 2 (quoting letter by advoca-
cy groups to the Secretary of the Treasury).
"" Charles Keenan, Citicorp to Buy EBT Business of Rival Transactive, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 2, 1998, at 14; Digest, WASH. POST, July 28, 1998, at El.
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to negotiate with these guys?" 1 38 Hence for most of the country,
"welfare reform" has meant that power devolved from a single
national authority down to the states, then back up again to national
corporations, then to a single national authority. The states, and
their needy populations, have merely replaced Uncle Sam with
Lockheed. The big difference is that the former is accountable to the
democratic process, but the latter is not. Taken at face value, the
arguments of welfare reformers emphasized that local government
would better meet the needs of benefit populations, that a single
national authority was too vast and impersonal, and that the states
would function as fifty laboratories for innovative policies. To have
one national corporation running the major benefit assistance pro-
gram thwarts every value advanced in support of defederalization.
Of all the prognostications about welfare devolution, no one pre-
dicted that it would devolve into farce in less than two years.
The drawbacks of privatization should have been well known
to policymakers. The effort to privatize correctional services, for
example, has been a widely reported disaster. Describing the failure
of prison privatization, Professor John Dilulio contends that the
history of private sector involvement in corrections is "'unrelievedly
bleak, a well-documented tale of inmate abuse and political corrup-
tion."" 39 As is rapidly becoming the case with welfare privatiza-
tion, private for-profits jumped into the prison market without ade-
quate knowledge, skills, or training. A brochure put out by the
World Research Group on prisons made the same promises that
have been made in the welfare context: "'While arrests and convic-
tions are steadily on the rise, profits are to be made-profits from
crime. Get in on the ground floor of this booming industry
now!"" 4 The same unhealthy incentives were put into place:
"Companies receive a guaranteed fee for each prisoner, regardless
of the actual costs. Every dime they don't spend on food or medical
care or training for guards is a dime they can pocket." 4' In 1995,
I Keenan, supra note 137, at 14.
Quoted in Francis Wilkinson, Taking Prisons Private, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 1988, at
100.
140 Quoted in Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Cold, supra note 119, at 45. For a
similar pitch made in the context of welfare reform, see supra note 120 and accompa-
nying text.
141 Eric Bates, Private Prisons, THE NATION, Jan. 5, 1998, at 11. For youthful offend-
ers, privatized prisons are notorious for 'brutality, cronyism, and neglect.' Fox
Butterfield, Profits at a Juvenile Prison Come with a Chilling Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
1998, at Al.
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a riot broke out at an immigrant detention center in Elizabeth, New
Jersey, run by Esmor Correctional Services, a for-profit prison
privatizer. As United States Representative Robert Menendez ex-
plained, "'It was a cauldron waiting to explode."'142 Former
detainees filed suit against several of the guards and testified that
the guards had beaten them, starved them, and squeezed their
genitals with pliers. 43
Privatization's embarrassing record has not stopped its support-
ers from declaring victory. Yet even when privatization "works,"
private corporations often do little more than the state. The major
promise of the Texas reformers, for example, was that privatization
would allow "one stop shopping" for benefits,144 but nothing pre-
vented the state welfare system from offering one stop shopping on
its own. Like many a welfare bureaucracy, America Works has been
accused of "creaming": separating out the best qualified recipients
and finding them jobs while ignoring needier clients.'45 Another
irony of privatization is that it has suddenly ennobled a task long
scorned by anti-welfare politicians and commentators. For years, a
staple of conservative critiques of social welfare policy has been
that welfare bureaucrats were parasites who could aspire to no
higher purpose in life than giving free handouts to the undeserv-
ing. 46 As R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., founder of the right-wing Amer-
ican Spectator, wrote in 1984, "'[tlhe welfare state ... ruined many
heretofore toiling Americans into parasites, and this new class of
busybodies live[s] as superparasites, deriving nourishment from the
dependence of the welfare clients. ' ' 47 The private businessmen
who take over these very same functions, however, are hailed as
142 Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Illegal Aliens Overrun a Jail in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 1995, at Al.
143 See Ronald Smothers, Asylum Seekers Testify on Abuse by Jail Guards, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1998, at Al.
'" See Harwood, supra note 7, at Al.
'4s See David Henry, Private Company Wins Praise by Making Profits from Welfare,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 2, 1991, at 82.
11 See Barbara Ehrenreich, The New Right Attack on Social Welfare, in THE MEAN
SEASON: THE ATrACK ON THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 165-70.
"' Quoted in Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Gold, supra note 119, at 49. The
reference is to MILOVAN DJlLAS, THE NEW CLASS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM
(Frederick A. Draeger ed., 2d ed. 1963) (1957), in which Djilas attacked the emerging
class of Communist apparachik in his native Yugoslavia. Djilas's major argument was
that while under Communism the state was supposed to wither away, instead it created
a new bureaucracy whose primary function seemed to be safeguarding its own privileg-
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entrepreneurial and visionary.'48 Even worse, what private corpo-
rations lack in expertise they seek to make up for by pillaging state
welfare departments and luring away key officials, the same officials
whose alleged incompetence created the problem in the first
place. 49 The possibility that a private contractor hires the welfare
workers they helped to disemploy is a somewhat encouraging pros-
pect, but labor unions object that this shuffle exchanges civil ser-
vice, unionized jobs with good benefits and pensions for nonuni-
onized positions.5 When the cleaning services for state buildings
in Buffalo, New York, were privatized, officials first claimed that
privatization would offer efficiency improvements. As it turned out,
the program relied on increased use of part-time workers, with
lower salaries and fewer benefits.' All this is privatization at its
most successful.5 2
A counterargument to the views of this Article could be that
corporations are already in the welfare business, not by assuming
control over state bureaucracies, but by offering generous benefit
packages to their own employees. If these corporations have experi-
14 See Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Gold, supra note 119, at 49.
Michigan's welfare director, Gerald H. Miller, left his post after the PRWORA was
passed to become senior vice president of welfare initiatives at Lockheed Martin. See
Havemann, supra note 108, at A13; see also Kunerth, supra note 116, at HI (At the
top of Lockheed Martin IMS' payroll are former officials from Miami Beach, Alaska,
Oregon, Texas and Washington, DC.).
Io See Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1. As one union representative argues, 'We
give workers an impossible job to do, limit the tools available to them and then say,
'Gee, it's not a great system.' If there is money to be had, it shouldn't be going into
some company's pocket. It should be put into services.' Id.is' See Herman, supra note 122, at 10.
152 One leading commentator on the issue of privatization generally supports the idea,
suggesting that it fulfills several values. See Lawrence, supra note 107, at 651 (oMy own
bias . . . is that frequently a delegation of public power to a private actor is not harm-
ful and indeed can benefit the public interest."). These values or features include plural-
ism, interest representation, flexibility, the ability to serve as a transitional stage to the
govemment's taking full responsibility over the issue, expertise, and cost-cutting. See id.
at 651-57.
Privatization seems to fall far short in this context. Now that the number of private
providers is so low, privatized welfare promotes neither pluralism nor interest representa-
tion, as there is no diversity among decision-makers. Second, the efforts of these private
agencies are not to serve as a practice run for full govemmental assumption of responsi-
bility over welfare policy because the momentum clearly runs in the opposite direction.
Third, these private providers are often lacking in expertise, compared to state welfare
departments. The only remaining values are cost-cutting and flexibility. So far, privatiza-
tion has been inordinately expensive, as the accompanying paragraphs in the text dem-
onstrate, and have offered little in the way of flexibility that the state could not have
done on its own.
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ence in successfully meeting the needs of their workers, then why
not allow them to do the same for others? The obvious response is
that businesses have a vested interest in ensuring the well-being of
their employees; most corporations would gladly spend a half mil-
lion dollars on their workers if the consequent gains in productivity
yielded tens of millions of dollars in profits. The more subtle re-
sponse, however, is that the counterargument takes the benefit
packages of big business to indicate attitudes supportive of the
welfare state. The opposite is more likely the case. Corporate bene-
fit policies do more than assist the worker, they also assuage
workers' demands for change in broader social welfare policies.
Sanford Jacoby, in his study of American corporate paternalism,
contends that management frequently uses generous corporate
policies to abate radicalization.5 3 Kodak, for example, adopted a
no-layoff policy in part to blunt its employees' desire for unioniza-
tion, s4 and its top managers lobbied to keep federal Social Secu-
rity benefits low so as to make Kodak's assistance programs seem
generous by comparison.' The most alarming aspect of these ef-
forts is not that major corporations might dupe their employees into
settling for less, but that Kodak's corporate priorities shaped social
policies affecting millions of people. Corporate welfare policies are
less an indicator of what businesses will do than what they will try
to avoid doing.""
s3 See SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITAUSM SINCE THE NEW
DEAL 236-52 (1997).
"s See id. at 82-83. Kodak has since revoked this policy. See id. at 94; Raymond
Hemandez, Deferring to Great Yellow Father: Kodak Workers Say Layoffs May Be Nec-
essary Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, § 1, at 41.
'SS ee JACOB'Y, supra note 153, at 214-19; see also id. at 219-20 (making similar
point in the context of national health insurance). Nor should this be surprising:
The private side of the welfare state is, however, private, and thus has no
responsibility to act as an equalizing, universalizing, or redistributive force.
State incentives designed to mobilize the private sector-business-for such
purposes will be effective only when they coincide with the interests of busi-
ness, that is, when they appear to be cost-effective. Non-clients of the private
welfare state, that is to say, non-employees of corporations offering childcare
and other services, have no purchase in it, no claim to its benefits.
Sonya Michel, Tale of Two States: Race, Gender, and PublicPrivate Welfare Provision in
Postwar America, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123, 155 (1997).
's' Beth Stevens has pointed out that once the state sets the boundary between the
welfare policies it will implement and what it will expect private companies to do,
private companies will do as little as possible within their assigned sphere. See Beth
Stevens, Blurring the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has Influenced Welfare
Benefits in the Private Sector, in POLTICS OF SOC. PoL'vY, supra note 89, at 123-48. Fur-
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In sum, welfare reform has had many regrettable consequences.
Chief among them is privatization. It seems quite ironic that the
states have urged devolution of welfare policy from the federal
government and succeeded on the strength of the argument that
local needs are best met by local services, only to vest operational
authority in national, if not multinational, corporations. Devolution,
after all, was supposed to result in decisions being made in state
capitals, rather than corporate boardrooms." 7 Welfare policy is
usually the product of different tensions between American values
and interest groups." 8 To have these value disputes played out in
the political process is one thing; to have a private company defini-
tively resolve them is another. Moreover, when arguably the main
function of welfare is to protect people from the market,"s9 it
seems perverse to allow the market to assume control over welfare
policy. 60 Privatization neither balances nor resolves the tension
between state and market; it simply surrenders social welfare to the
thermore, private welfare policies, such as corporate pensions or insurance benefits, tend
to assist those who are least needy, as they are already employed. Public welfare poli-
cies, in contrast, assist the hard-core poor. The fact that public and private assistance
programs aid very different populations is usually overlooked in the mad dash to pro-
claim that the private sector does a better job in social policy. See id. at 147 ('Because
public programs serve marginal groups whose needs are greater and more intractable,
they are less likely to appear to be effective.').
"I Cf. Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Cold, supra note 119, at 49 ('Compared
with the torchbearers of intemational capitalism, a deputy social service director from,
say, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, is a remnant of a dying culture.').
"5 These conflicts arise from deeply held values conceming autonomy, work, commu-
nity, and family. For a discussion of these conflicts and their complexity, see ELLWOOD,
supra note 10, at 16-26.
159 See Piven & Cloward, supra note 11, at 95-96 ('Welfare state programs protect
people from the vagaries of the labor market and the power of particular employers by
providing income that is not conditional on market performance.'). Furthermore, as Piven
and Cloward have argued, "Market-oriented relief reforms help to produce the demoraliz-
ing effects on recipients that are attributed to the fact of social provision itself.' Id. at
37. In their earlier work, Piven and Cloward suggested that one important goal of wel-
fare policy was to keep the working class in line. Keeping benefits low and forcing
individuals to work at any job, no matter how demeaning, are responsible for more
human misery than angst over living on a welfare check. See PiVEN & CLOWARD, supra
note 21, at 173-75.
"6 This result is not necessarily illogical. See Piven & Cloward, supra note 11, at 93.("The idea that the self-regulating market must necessarily be pre-eminent in political,
social, and individual life is capitalism's central myth.'); see also MARMOR ET AL., supra
note 10, at 209 ("The politics of medical care in the United States has traditionally fa-
vored free market ideology.').
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profit motive. As has been noted in the prison context, privatization
"is really about privatizing tax dollars, about transforming public
money into private profits."'"'
C. The Impact of Technology
Welfare reform has also spurred the implementation of new
technologies intended to cut costs, curb fraud, and improve servic-
es. This Section will evaluate two of the most important develop-
ments. First, Electronic Benefit Transfer ("EBT") is significant largely
for reasons of scale; all Food Stamp benefits are to be processed
through EBT by fiscal year 2003. Second, digital imaging merits
analysis as it has become a high-profile, high-tech way to prevent
fraud, or so its supporters would claim. Both technologies have
severe drawbacks. If welfare bureaucracies are incompetent, poorly
monitored, underfunded, or overworked, then new technology will
not solve the problem: it will simply provide new ways for such
bureaucracies to be ineffective. Because neither technology address-
es root problems, but simply adds a new, more complicated overlay
to an already troubled system, adopting either raises a number of
thorny issues.'62
1. Electronic Benefit Transfer
In contrast to the national debate that accompanied the passage
of the PRWORA in 1996, one of the most groundbreaking develop-
ments in welfare policy occurred with little fanfare years before, the
development of EBT. 163 EBT distributes benefits through ATM ma-
chines and "point of sale" devices ("POS") at supermarkets and
other retail outlets. Benefit recipients use a debit card to access their
accounts164 in much the same way many consumers use their
161 Bates, supra note 141, at 15.
162 Some states combine the programs. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 414.391(1) (West
Supp. 1998) ("The Department of Children and Family Services shall develop and imple-
ment, as part of the electronic benefits transfer program, a statewide program to prevent
public assistance fraud by using a type of automated fingerprint imaging . . . ."); TEX.
HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 31.0325(a) (West Supp. 1998) (same).
" The United States Dairy Association took the first step in developing an EBT pro-
gram in 1983 when it set up its Electronic Benefit Transfer Alternative Issuance Demon-
stration Project. See General Notice, 48 FED. REG. 31,431 (1983). See generally 7 C.F.R.
§ 274.12 (1998) (setting forth EBT regulations).
I The relevant regulation explains:
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ATM or credit cards to ring up purchases at the supermarket
checkout. The underlying premise of the program is that by giving
Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF")
benefits directly to recipients, the government will save on the
administrative costs of sending the funds to the states, which then
divide funds among recipients. This system would replace the byz-
antine welfare bureaucracy with a simple transfer of wealth. As one
court has noted, "EBT thus promises the efficiencies of a direct
deposit system and the conveniences of a debit card." 16  The
PRWORA required all states to move to EBT by October 1, 2002,
totally eliminating paper Food Stamps. 166 EBT programs have
spread across the nation in anticipation of the deadline., 67
An on-line EBT system is a computer-based system in which the benefit au-
thorization is received from a central computer through a point-of-sale (POS)
terminal. Eligible households utilize magnetic-stripe plastic cards and have
accounts maintained at the central computer in lieu of food stamp coupons to
purchase food items at authorized food retailers. Once certified, the
household's benefits are electronically loaded into a central computer account
for each month during the certification period. Checkout lanes at authorized
food retailers are to be equipped with POS terminals. When the transaction
occurs, the POS terminals connect on-line to the central computer database;
verify the validity of the Personal Identification Number (PIN), card number,
and the amount of available benefits in an EBT account; obtain authorization
for each purchase and initiate the debiting of the household's account and the
crediting of the retailer's account.
7 C.F.R. § 274.12(a). Note that the regulations cited in this Article are Food Stamp
regulations and do not address the full universe of federal- benefits. For a thorough de-
scription of the operation and problems of EBT, see Barbara Leyser, Recipient Concerns
with the Use of Electronic Benefit Transfer Systems for the Delivery of State and Federal
Benefits, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file at the Brooklyn
Law Review); Barbara Leyser & Adele M. Blong, The Use of Electronic Benefit Transfer
Systems to Deliver Federal and State Assistance Benefits, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 406(1993); Kathryn O'Neill Pulliam, Notes & Comments, Muddying the Water: Electronic
Benefits Transfer After the Welfare Reform Act of 1996, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 515
(1998).
165 Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
166 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 825(a)(1)(i)(1)(A) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i)(1)(A) (1994 &
Supp. 1997)).
"6 For a listing of each state's progress toward the deadline, see Summary of State
EBT Implementation Information-July 1998 (prepared by Barbara Leyser, EBT Consultant
to the National Consumer Law Center) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
For state statutes requiring the implementation of EBT, see, for example, ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-76-213 (Michie 1997); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 10065-77 (West 1998);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-2-104 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.942 (West
1997); 15 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/9-05 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-13-14-1
through 12 (West 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 450.1 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 21-22 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1-28-29 (1997); MO. ANN. STAT.
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As millions of Americans rely on ATMs to do their banking,
ATM machines would seem a commonsense way to distribute bene-
fits. One important advantage is that obtaining one's benefits from
an ATM machine rather than a welfare office or a check cashing
outlet removes the stigma of dependency from the poor. As one
EBT task force leader explains, "'There's a certain social stig-
ma-right or wrong-to be standing in line, and people behind you
are looking at you with your food stamps. With an EBT card, you're
part of the mainstream of society."'168 Having beneficiaries use the
same financial mechanisms as mainstream America also serves to
eliminate stigma by creating a bank account of sorts; recipients will
supposedly be able to manage their account almost as bank con-
sumers balance their checkbooks.'69 Some benefit recipients have
expressed initial enthusiasm. As one Washington state Food Stamp
recipient commented, "'Plastic works for the rest of America, so it
works for me.""' 7
§ 208.182 (West 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.33 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 71-3-160 (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.08A.020 (West 1997); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 49.129 (West 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-102(a)(iii) (Michie 1997).
16 Alisa Wabnik, Food Stamps Will Soon Look Like Debit Cards, ARIz. DAILY STAR,
Aug. 24, 1997, at 1B (quoting state EBT official Dayne Coffey); see also Brett Johnson,
'Dignity Card' Helps Strip the Stigma from Food Stamp Use, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997,
at A3. EBT systems could therefore reduce reliance on what one analyst calls "fringe
banks,' the check-cashing outlets and pawnshops used by poor individuals who are
unable to set up checking accounts at commercial banks. See John P. McCaskey, Ex-
plaining the Boom in Check Cashing Outlets and Pawnshops, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 4 (1995). These merchants are unlikely to give up without a fight. See Shannon
O'Boyle, Check Cashers Set for War, DAILY NEwS (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 1998, Metro Section,
at 1.
69 See Leyser, supra note 164, at 4; Kimball Perry, Smart Card Replacing Food
Stamps; Hamilton County to Switch to Program by End of Year, CINN. POST, Oct. 8,
1997, at 14A; Christopher Rowland, Welfare Going Electronic; Debit Cards Will Replace
Welfare Checks and Food Stamps in Rhode Island Next Year, PROVIDENCE J.-BuLL, Oct.
9, 1997, at A01 & A21 (citing claims made by Director of Rhode Island Department of
Human Services). This point assumes that merely using a quasi-credit card will be
enough to remove the stigma of poverty. Yet much of the commentary on the stigma
felt by welfare recipients suggests that the real crux of the stigma is being unemployed.
For a thorough development of the relationship between welfare, stigma, and work, see
WILSON, supra note 106, at 64-65 (noting isolation of welfare recipients). On stigma
more generally, see IRWIN GARFINKEL & SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN: A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA 39-40 (1986) (describing stigma felt by some wel-
fare recipients).
17o AP, Some Welfare Recipients Will Get Debit Cards, NEWS TRiB. (Tacoma, WA),
Sept. 27, 1997, at B4.
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The potential advantages of EBT include not only dignitary
values, but also the elimination of practical problems including mail
theft, late receipt of benefits, crime at ATM machines, and check-
cashing fees.' 7 ' As noted above, the dominant justification for EBT
is that it will save money by sending benefits directly to the recipi-
ent, obviating the need for state bureaucracies to process pay-
ments.'72 EBT would also reduce the paperwork that grocers must
do to collect the value of redeemed Food Stamps.'73 Finally, EBT
promoters argue that EBT will reduce crime. If recipients carry a
plastic card with a secret PIN number rather than cash, they will be
less attractive targets for robbery. 74 Even if robbed, the account
can be frozen once the beneficiary reports that the card has been
stolen. 7" EBT is also hailed as a way to eliminate fraud. 76 As
one welfare official pointed out, "'There won't be any food stamps
to sell for money."" 77 In short, EBT promises to solve a wide vari-
ety of problems.
The practical application of this technology, however, has been
less encouraging. The first disturbing trend is the concentration of
power in few hands. EBT is "one of the privatizers' favorite innova-
tions,"'78 and with good reason. EBT does not simply send funds
from the Treasury to individual accounts; instead, federal benefits
are sent to a type of holding account, often owned by a bank or
"' See Leyser, supra note 164, at 3-4.
"7 See Michael Buettner, Retailers Respond Slowly to Electronic Food Stamps, Wel-
fare System, ORLANDo Bus. I., Sept. 12, 1997, at 19 (estimating savings of $4 million
for the state of Florida); New Welfare Benefit Card Could Save $1 Million, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1997, at 3B (noting $1 million savings for the state
of Missouri); Jack Sherzer, Merchant Group Sues Over Benefits Automation, HARRISBURG
PATRIOT, Sept. 27, 1997, at B01 (estimating savings of $25 million for the state of Penn-
sylvania). But cf. Rick Stouffer, Checks Aren't Checking Out; Electronic Transfers Aren't
Replacing Checks, BUFFALO NEwS, Jan. 6, 1998, at 1E (noting argument that paper
checks are cheaper than electronic transfers). Budnitz ascribes more extensive costs to
EBT, ranging from computer software and hardware, to backup systems. See Budnitz,
supra note 86, at 750.
,73 See Rowland, supra note 169, at A01.
174 See Sherzer, supra note 172, at B01.
"T See Perry, supra note 169, at 14A. In Georgia, for example, officials estimate that
every year $1 million in food stamps is lost or stolen before ever reaching the intended
recipient. See Susanna Capelouto, Welfare Debit Cards, (NPR Morning Edition, Oct. 2,
1997), available in 1997 WL 12823406.
176 See Perry, supra note 169, at 14A; Rowland, supra note 169, at A01 (quoting
claims made by Director of Rhode Island Department of Human Services).
'" See Perry, supra note 169, at 14A (citing head of Hamilton County (Ohio) Wel-
fare Department).
" Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Gold, supra note 119, at 50.
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other private corporation. In Transactive Corp. v. United States,
which arose out of a challenge to the EBT bidding process,'79 the
D.C. Circuit ruled that the Treasury Department had erred in the
bidding process it employed for potential EBT administrators. Specif-
ically, the Treasury Department had relied on the "mistaken belief"
that only a governmental agent could bid for EBT contracts; instead,
the bidding should have been opened to a broad array of private
financial institutions. 8' Yet a relatively small number of private
contractors have snatched up EBT programs across the country.
Citicorp Services Inc. operates the Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Alaska EBT programs.' 8 ' Citibank EBT Services
operates the Pennsylvania system under a $110 million con-
tract,'82 and recently acquired Transactive's system in Indiana,
Illinois, Texas, and Sacramento County, California.'83 Louisiana,
Wisconsin, Idaho, and San Diego and San Bernardino counties in
California rely on Deluxe Corporation for their system opera-
tion."'84 Having so few major EBT providers is risky as thousands
of people would be affected by a system error in a single provider's
operation. This is exactly what happened on October 14, 1997,
when a computer failure at Deluxe caused an "EBT meltdown" in
Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, and
Oregon. The EBT cards simply stopped working.'
In 91 F.3d 232, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Transactive also filed suit in three states seek-
ing to enjoin the award of an EBT contract to Citibank on the ground that the bidding
process was unfair. All three suits, in Kentucky, Michigan, and New York, failed. See In
re Transactive Corp. v. New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 665 N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997), cert. granted, 91 N.Y.2d 812 (N.Y. 1998); Company Sues State Over
System That Will Replace Food Stamps, COURIER-J. (Kentucky), Nov. 8, 1997, at B5;
Amy Lane, Losing Bidder Challenges Welfare Contract Award, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus.,
Nov. 17, 1997, at 6;
180 91 F.3d at 233, 235. The court may have correctly interpreted the Treasury
Department's own regulations to include entities that were not financial agents of the
federal government. See id. at 237 (citing 31 C.F.R. §§ 202.2, 206.2, 210.2, 3332).
However, the court minimized the policy concerns the Treasury Department could ratio-
nally have relied on to limit the financial institutions that would handle EBT.
' See Rowland, supra note 169, at A01 (RI, CT, MA); EBT Elsewhere, EFT REP.,
Sept. 10, 1997, at 1 (AK).
"I0 See Sherzer, supra note 172, at B01.
183 See supra note 137.
14 See EBT Elsewhere, supra note 181, at 1 (LA, WI); Dave Goins, Retailers Wary of
Electronic Welfare, IDAHO Bus. REV., Aug. 25, 1997, at 1A (ID); Caitlin Rother, County
OKs Vendor for Food Stamp System, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Aug. 16, 1997, at B4.
"8S See Isabelle Sender, Processing Slowdown Makes for EBT Meltdown, CHAIN STORE
AGE, Dec. 1, 1997, at 216; Marsha Shuler, Food Stamp Service is Interrupted, BATON
ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 16, 1997, at 21A.
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Allowing private contractors to deliver EBT services creates
additional tension in the relationship between the state and retailers,
whose cooperation is essential to the success of EBT. In a number
of states, including Pennsylvania and Louisiana, retailers have sued
over the costs imposed by EBT, alleging that the state has sought to
pass on the cost of the point of sale ("POS") terminals onto retail-
ers."8 6 These complaints suggest that the states may be saving
money on EBT largely by shifting costs elsewhere. 87 Moreover,
Pennsylvania and Louisiana have not yet been able to persuade
banks not to charge third-party fees. 88 Privatization hardly repre-
sents a step forward if the states are simply shifting their costs onto
others."8 9
The claim that EBT would eliminate fraud is likewise overstat-
ed. Fraudulent behavior has simply taken on other forms. In New
Jersey and New Orleans, for example, recently exposed fraud
186 See Sherzer, supra note 168, at B01 (noting suit by 1,900 food stores); see also
Wabnik, supra note 168, at 1B (noting concerns of Arizona retailers). The basic problem
is that state guidelines often do not allow the use of state-supplied point of sale (POS')
terminals to accept cash assistance benefits, only Food Stamps. Naturally, retailers want a
single machine in the supermarket aisle to accept all purchases. The choice faced by
retailers, therefore, is whether to get the single free state-supplied machine that only
handles Food Stamps or to get a commercial machine at substantial cost. See Buettner,
supra note 172, at 19; Pennsylvania Retailers File Suit Over Third-Party Processing Fees,
EFT REP., Sept. 24, 1997, at 1.
"' Nor are these fees reimbursed by the state, see Pennsylvania Retailers, supra note
186, chart at 1, even though imposing such costs on retailers is inconsistent with the
federal regulations on EBT. See infra note 277.
18 See Sherzer, supra note 172, at B01 (Pa.); Louisiana Retailers Pick Fight That
Could Shake EBT Industry, EFT REP., Sept. 10, 1997, at 1. In Louisiana, a court battle
has erupted over whether the EBT provider, Deluxe Corp., should be required to pay
third-party fees. The state legislature passed a law requiring Deluxe to assume these
costs, but Deluxe has objected that this requirement was not in the contract they signed
with the state. See Louisiana Retailers, supra, at 1. The sponsor of the legislation was
state Democratic Representative Jimmy Long of Natchitoches, a retired grocer. See Susan
Finch, Welfare Card Company Sues Over Reimbursing Retailer Fees, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Aug. 5, 1997, at C4. Until the fee dispute can be worked out, Louisiana retailers have
been made to pay the fees. See Marsha Shuler, Fee Problem Hits Welfare Card Pro-
gram, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 5, 1997, at 4A.
18 Another example of the effort to shift fees away from the private providers is the
cost of "toll free" calls. In October 1997, the Federal Communications Commission ruled
that states must bear the cost of '800" number calls made by EBT participants from pay
phones to the free help desks maintained by the EBT processors. See Charles Keenan,
800-Number Charges Denting States' EBT Plans, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 1998, at 1. In
Massachusetts alone, the costs of such calls would be more than $200,000. See id. Not
surprisingly, the reaction of major EBT providers Citicorp and Deluxe has been to insist
that the states pay for the calls themselves or block all free assistance phone calls made
by EBT participants, thereby eliminating a major source of benefit assistance. See id.
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schemes involved grocery clerks ringing up bogus charges on the
card, then giving the cardholders seventy cents on the dollar. The
clerks or owners kept the rest, which for one store added up to
$50,000 a month." ° An EBT card essentially allows individuals to
commit the same kind of fraud they could with a regular credit
card, where the cardholder asks the retailer to ring up nonexistent
purchases.'91 Still, EBT may be an improvement; as one New
Jersey paper noted, "The card makes fraud both simpler to carry out
and easier to detect."'92 Although EBT may purport to reduce
crime as it reduces the amount of money that individuals carry
around, 93 "many consumers have been mugged at ATM sites and
subjected to fraudulent practices whereby their funds have been
withdrawn without their authorization." 94 EBT only makes the
benefit population vulnerable to the kind of crime faced by all ATM
users, but without the same consumer protections.
Finally, EBT raises the threat of invasiveness. EBT "has the
potential for rapid and systematic assembly of information about
when funds were used, how much was spent, in what place, and
for what purchases."' 95 Many supermarkets are able to keep close
tabs on exactly what a specific consumer purchases, usually by
"' See Editorial, The Cardsharps, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Aug. 9, 1997, at 8 (de-
scribing case in which merchants ran up bogus purchases in exchange for cash); Jerry
DeMarco, 16 Grocers Accused of Fraud With Food Stamp Debit Cards, THE RECORD
(Bergen County), Aug. 5, 1997, at A4; see also Food Stamp Defrauders Ordered to Re-
pay, POST & COURIER, Dec. 16, 1997, at B6 (EBT prosecution in South Carolina); Hamil
R. Harris, Food Stamps Are a Bargain on DC Streets: Hustlers Trade Cash, Drugs, Stolen
Goods, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1997, at Al (describing fraud before and after EBT); N.O.
Police Seize Welfare Debit Cards; Store Owner, 19, Booked on Fraud, Theft, BATON
ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 6, 1997, at 4B (describing case in which store owner stole and
used 42 welfare debit cards).
191 For two federal prosecutions of such conduct, see United States v. Wilson, 81
F.3d 1300 (4th Cir. 1996), and Rivera v. United States Dep't of Agric., 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13426 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
192 Cardsharps, supra note 190, at 8. As one federal official put it, 'We continue to
rock and roll in Maryland. We return indictments there weekly.' DeMarco, supra note
190, at A4 (quoting Robert G. Viadero, inspector general of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture).
" Some advocates object that recipients can just as easily be compelled by force or
threat of force to withdraw money from their account, as some criminals will force an
individual at gunpoint to withdraw money from an ATM. Were the card usable only at
a POS terminal in a retailer's checkout aisle, this problem would be mitigated, but at
the cost of reducing privacy and access to benefits.
19 Budnitz, supra note 86, at 752-53; see also id. at 769.
19S Mark Leymaster, Electronic Banking and the Poor: On the Short End of an Expen-
sive Stick, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 721, 728 (1980) (emphasis omitted).
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offering a special card touted as a pass to the "Savings Club." In
return for a few cents discount, consumers hand over a great deal of
information about their consumption patterns.196 Other consumer
information services are then able to compile this data along with
credit card or bank purchases. Obviously, none of this is to suggest
that welfare service providers care which breakfast cereal people
eat, but other purchases are weighted with importance in the con-
text of welfare eligibility. How can a single mother on TANF say
that she is caring for three children when she is only buying enough
food for two? Why did the recipient suddenly stop buying an item
she usually purchased-was there another contributor to the family's
budget? Why did recipients not buy groceries for two weeks-were
they away from home, and if so, with whom, why, and for how
long? As trivial as these questions may seem, enforcing the "man in
the house" rule of the 1960s involved analogous investigations.'97
This information could then be used to restrict recipients' ability to
purchase certain items. New York's cashless welfare benefits system,
for example, would impose restrictions on where the poor could
shop and what they could buy.'98 In the past, welfare caseworkers
spent a great deal of time and effort seeking the answers to these
questions. Thanks to EBT, this information is now readily available.
As one commentator contends, "These cards are in effect national
identity cards, and as such spark privacy and security
concerns."
199
Health insurance cards already track private information.
Pennsylvania's EBT/Medicaid card, for example, allows the state to
track prescriptions.2" On the one hand, a health care card like
that promoted by the Western Governors' Association would be a
tremendous benefit in that it would, as supporters contend, "lower
administrative barriers to care by reducing the paperwork."20' Yet
it would also "enhance the tracking of health care outcomes and
medical decision-making by increasing the availability and accuracy
196 See O'Harrow, supra note 87, at Al.
197 See supra text accompanying note 21.
' See Sara-Ellen Amster, Critics Envision Chaos if State Uses Cashless Welfare Sys-
tem, REP. DISPATCH, Sept. 23, 1997, at Al. To some degree, there are restrictions al-
ready in place. Food Stamps cannot be used to buy alcohol or cigarettes. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2012(g)(1) (1998).
199 Budnitz, supra note 86, at 764.
200 See Sherzer, supra note 172, at B01.
Western Governors Pilot Health Card, EFT REP., Sept. 10, 1997, at 1.
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of health statistics."" 2 Policy analysts may rejoice at the thought
of all this information, encoded on personal health cards, pouring
into a central data bank, but such extensive and easy information
gathering raises numerous privacy concerns.03 Likewise, the argu-
ment that the card would "promote personal responsibility by plac-
ing individuals in control of the information on the card"2" has
two faces. Allowing beneficiaries to take control of their own health
care is clearly a good thing, but suggesting that they will somehow
be made to answer for taking care of their health, or any other basic
human need, is quite another.
2. Digital Imaging
Fingerprinting, also known as digital imaging, has also become
an extremely popular aspect of welfare policy in recent years. It is
also overrated-a high-tech, high-profile system that often turns into
a net money loser. This new fraud prevention technology has
turned into a massive drain on state coffers without uncovering
much fraud. To the extent that adoption of digital imaging has led
to decreased caseloads, much of this reduction is simply application
dissuasion. It takes a leap of faith to suggest that only criminals are
dissuaded.
Digital imaging has been implemented among Home Relief
recipients in New York,2"' General Relief recipients in Califor-
nia,2" and General Assistance recipients in Connecticut.27 New
York approved a pilot program for Onondaga and Rockland Coun-
ties, which ran from October 1992 to March 1994, to fingerprint all
Home Relief applicants. State officials, including Democratic Gover-
22 Id.
The state obviously has some interest in the way its Medicaid funds are spent.
Few would endorse a system that allows beneficiaries to obtain cosmetic surgery on the
public's dime. Once policymakers agree on a list of services Medicaid will cover, how-
ever, privacy concerns may outweigh the state's interests in finding out who received
which of those covered services.
2 Western Governors, supra note 201, at 1.
205 N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 139-a (McKinney Supp. 1995). For an extended comment
on this legislation, see Note, Recent Legislation, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1168 (1996). An
enthusiastic argument in support of the New York law as proposed is James J. Killerlane
III, Note, Fingerlmaging: A 21st Century Solution to Welfare Fraud at Our Fingertips, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1327 (1995).
206 Leslie Berger, Savings Seen in Welfare Fingerprint Program, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1994, at B1.
207 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-30 (1997) (creating 'biometric identifier system').
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nor Mario Cuomo, hailed the program and approved its implemen-
tation for Nassau and Westchester Counties."' In Suffolk County,
officials pointed to fingerprinting as the reason for a twenty percent
drop in the welfare caseload.09 Los Angeles County began fin-
gerprinting of all applicants for General Relief in 1991210 and ex-
panded the procedure to include AFDC recipients in 1994 under a
federal waiver. " Finally, Connecticut began fingerprinting recipi-
ents in January 1996.212 Other jurisdictions are soon to
follow."3 States confined their fingerprinting programs to state
benefit programs before the PRWORA, but can now expand this
policy to the general welfare population.
One striking feature of the fingerprinting efforts in all three
states is that the state spent vast sums of money to catch only a
handful of people. In the first year of its fingerprinting program, Los
Angeles County spent $9.6 million dollars to set up and operate a
program. It caught only two double-dippers.214 New York spent
$10 million a year on fingerprinting, and could only point to $2.5
million in savings over two years.215  Rockland County, the first
county to fingerprint recipients in 1993, has not yet found a double-
dipper.216  Nor has Suffolk County, while Nassau County has
caught four fraudulent claimants in two years.217 Most embarrass-
ing, however, is Connecticut's fingerprinting program. Connecticut
20 See Kevin Sack, Cuomo Sanctions Fingerprint Scans, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1994, at
1.
209 See Debra McGrath-Kerr, Pols Hand it to Finger-Imaging, DAILY NEws, Sept. 19,
1995, Suburban Section, at 1.
220 See Hugo Martin, County Welfare Recipients Fingerprinted, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1991, at B1.
211 See Fingerprinting of Federal Welfare Applicants Begins, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16,
1994, at B2.
212 See Larry Williams, Fingerprinting is All Thumbs on First Day, HARTFORD COU-
RANT, Jan. 23, 1996, at Al.
213 Other jurisdictions that have proposed fingerprinting include Washington state, see
Editorial, Foreman: Drop That Fingerprinting Proposal, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at
B4; Massachusetts, see Connie Page, Weld Administration Pushing Plan to Fingerprint
Welfare Recipients, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 13, 1996, at 16; and Arkansas, see Ray
Pierce, Flanagin Suggests Fingerprints to Rub Welfare Fraud Out, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAzETTE, Apr. 10, 1998, at B2. Canada has even begun fingerprinting certain welfare
recipients. See James Wallace, Workfare Bill Becomes Law, TORONTO SUN, Nov. 26,
1997, at 3.
2 Martin, supra note 210, at B1.
220 See Robert Polner, Whorl of Controversy, Critics Say Welfare Fingerprinting is
Overkill, NEWSDAY, Feb. 2, 1998, at A3.
21. See id.
27 See id.
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spent $5.1 million dollars and turned up a grand total of six possi-
ble cases of fraud, or .00008% of all recipients.218 Thus, the state
spent $850,000 to catch each offender. As one commentator point-
ed out: "[Tihe state could have let them swipe the dough for 235
years and still have been ahead."219 Additionally, the new system
was plagued by glitches: the first few people fingerprinted were
flagged as frauds because the computer concluded that their prints
were already in the database. As they were the very first to be
fingerprinted, this was impossible.2 20  A recent study in Texas
reached a similar conclusion: the costs of fingerprinting were ex-
traordinary in light of its dubious ability to prevent fraud.22'
If fingerprinting was ever intended as a fraud prevention de-
vice, it has been a dismal failure. Welfare officials have pronounced
it a success, however, largely because of its ability to churn welfare
recipients. For example, an evaluation of the fingerprinting program
in Los Angeles County, which serves 900,000 poor people, found
only sixty-two cases of fraud. However, county officials declared
that the program had saved $4.5 million in a single month.222 The
County maintained that because it sent out letters to continuing
cases asking them to come in and be fingerprinted as.a condition of
eligibility, and because many people refused to do so and were
dropped from the rolls, each case could be presumptively consid-
ered fraud.223 Yet many recipients might not have gotten notice of
the new requirement or were intimidated by the policy. Similarly,
after the first three months of fingerprinting in San Francisco, city
officials found only twelve cases of fraud in a population of 15,000,
but declared 400 discontinuances evidence of fraud.224 San Fran-
215 See Million-Dollar Criminals, NEw HAVEN ADVOC., Dec. 11, 1996.
219 Denis Horgan, Millions Squandered Pursuing Fantasy of Welfare Fraud, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 29, 1996, at A2.
22I See Williams, supra note 212, at Al.
221 See Bill Minutaglio, State's Welfare-Fraud Program Doesn't Work, Study Says,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Oct. 30, 1997, at 19A.
222 Berger, supra note 206, at B. The month was August 1994. See id.
21 See id. New York officials made the same assessment when the welfare rolls in
Rockland and Onondaga counties dropped by 4.3%. See Kimberly J. McLarin, Inkless
Fingerprinting Starts for New York City Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1995, at B3 [here-
inafter Inkless Fingerprinting]. One commentator notes this drop and concludes that the
pilot fingerprinting project was "successful,' as those who elected not to enroll "offered
no justifiable reason as to why they did not reapply.' Killerlane, supra note 205, at
1339. Hence the definition of 'success' becomes not actual cases of fraud but scaring
people off. Nor does digital imaging address the widespread problem of provider fraud.
22 See John King, Welfare Recipients Shy Away: SF Fingerprint Law May Have
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cisco Department of Social Services Manager Brian Cahill admitted,
"'Actual discontinuances are where the savings come from.'"22 In
other words, the state makes more money scaring people away than
actually catching the one in a million fraudulent case.
Fingerprinting has frequently been attacked as stigmatizing,
demeaning, or dehumanizing.22 6 Many recipients are particularly
concerned about what happens with their fingerprints once they are
filed into a computer system.227 A legal challenge to fingerprinting
on the ground that it stigmatizes individuals, however, is unlikely to
succeed. Courts have allowed fingerprinting in a variety of non-
criminal contexts228 and are unlikely to be overly sympathetic to
welfare recipients. Underscoring the relationship between finger-
printing and criminality, conservative columnist William Safire
recently fumed that, "Encouraged by an act of Congress, Texas and
Caused Hundreds to Flee the System, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 1994, at A19.
22 Quoted in id.
See Stephen Loffredo, 'If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi': The Commerce Clause
and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 147, 148 n.6
(1993); see also Christopher Keating & Tom Puleo, Welfare Reform Clears Senate;
Rowland Plan Among Strictest in Nation, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 13, 1995, at Al
('[F]ingerprinting is primarily associated with breaking the law . . . .') (paraphrasing
argument of State Sen. Toni Harp). There have, however, been surveys of welfare recip-
ients that find that fingerprinting is not viewed as stigmatizing, see Will Sentell, Finger-
printing Proposal Draws Support, Criticism, KANSAS CrIY STAR, Mar. 14, 1997, at C4, but
there are obvious selection problems with such surveys. For one thing, those opposed
to, or afraid of, fingerprinting are no longer in the system.
22" See McLarin, Inkless Fingerprinting, supra note 223, at B3 ("'You don't know what
they're going to do with them once they have them.") (quoting recipient Thomas Amer).
For a series of proposed safeguards on the security of digital images, see Jennifer K.
Constance, Comment, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: Issues and Options
Surrounding Their Use to Prevent Welfare Fraud, 59 ALB. L. REv. 399, 416-22 (1995).
" The lead case in this area is Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp.
1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exch., 425 F.2d 1074
(2d Cir. 1970), which rejected a challenge to a New York law requiring all employees
of firms of national security exchanges and affiliated companies to be fingerprinted as a
condition of employment. Thom is frequently cited not simply for its ringing declaration
that '[p]laintiffs' contention that fingerprinting is an affront to their dignity and an inva-
sion of their privacy is without substance,' Thorn, 306 F. Supp. at 1007, but also for its
extensive list of cases in which fingerprinting in noncriminal contexts has been upheld.
The Thorn court attached an appendix citing over thirty state laws requiring fingerprint-
ing in a noncriminal context. See id. at 1012.
Courts have continued to uphold laws similar to those cited in Thorn. See
lacobucci v. City of Newport, 785 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding ordinance
requiring employees of adult entertainment establishments to be fingerprinted and photo-
graphed); Utility Workers Union of Am. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 664 F. Supp. 136
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting challenge to federal law requiring the fingerprinting of all
employees of nuclear power plants).
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California now demand thumbprints of applicants for drivers' licens-
es-treating all drivers as potential criminals."22 9 Few complained,
however, when the same sort of requirements were imposed on
welfare recipients, even though it has been some thirty years since
Charles Reich famously argued that both licenses and welfare bene-
fits were part of the "new property" of government largesse granted
to individuals only on terms dictated by the state.230
It is unfortunate that many welfare services departments find
digital imaging so alluring, for it represents a triumph of a techno-
logical fad over meaningful reform. Similarly, EBT has been rushed
into place without sufficient thought given to the critical issues it
raises. One such issue is privacy. Although most states with finger-
printing programs have firewall provisions in place that prevent the
sharing of digital image files with other state agencies,23' it is not
difficult to imagine states violating these prohibitions in the name of
prosecuting or preventing fraud. Nor would it be irrational for states
to claim that they have an interest in knowing exactly what welfare
recipients bought with their benefit funds. In the past, the costs of
monitoring recipients so closely were prohibitive. With the new
technology discussed in this section, gathering extremely invasive
information takes but a few keystrokes. Finally, the use of these
technologies as churning devices is even more pronounced in a
privatized welfare system, in which a private corporation's fiduciary
duties are to keep costs down and profits high.
III. THE NEWLY A-TENUATED RIGHTS OF WELFARE RECIPIENTS
Welfare policy has long been in dire need of reform. Yet in-
stead of reforming the system to improve the lives of the poor and
expand the ability of states and localities to meet basic human
needs, the federal government abdicated its responsibility and sim-
ply handed over the mess to the states. In turn, many states auc-
tioned off the crisis to private corporations peddling glitzy promises
of hightech solutions. Few expected devolution's main beneficiaries
to be not the states, nor their citizens, but corporations like
Lockheed Martin. The failure to confront the misperceptions and
22' Safire, supra note 87, at A29.
230 The classic articles are Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964),
and Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
213 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-30(1) (1997).
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mistakes that are such a dominant part of our understanding of wel-
fare policy has led to less democratic control over policy, not only
in that we are unable to make informed choices, but also that we
are more willing to hand this power over to private corpora-
tions.232
This Part will explore remedies to the specific dangers that the
new system of decentralized, privatized benefit provision presents
to the individual rights of welfare recipients. It will begin by rees-
tablishing the relevance of the seminal welfare rights case Goldberg
v. Kelly.233 Although the PRWORA expressly eliminated an entitle-
ment to assistance, no statute could eliminate the constitutional
guarantees of due process that Goldberg enforced. Next, it will
examine three critical areas in which these due process rights are in
danger: the right to apply for benefits; the right to fair notice of
changes in one's eligibility or benefit amount; and the right to a fair
hearing. As this Article argues, a privatized welfare system requires
a level of due process protections similar to the fair hearings proce-
dure the PRWORA eliminated.234 Privatization and technological
innovation has thus far created hurdles to application, failed to
provide adequate notice to recipients, and infected a wide variety of
eligibility decisions with private pecuniary interests. This Article
contends that all three deficiencies must be remedied.
A. The Continuing Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly
At first glance, Goldberg v. Kelly seems to be one of the casual-
ties of welfare reform. The PRWORA sought to put an end to the
period in our legal history in which federal courts intervened on
behalf of welfare recipients. Section 401(b) of the PRWORA, estab-
lishing Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF"), the re-
placement for AFDC, makes clear that, "This part shall not be inter-
preted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any
2' Cf. MARMOR ET AL, supra note 10, at 213-14.
23 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2" This argument relies on due process because the welfare case law relies so often
on the Due Process Clause as a source of constitutional protection. Others have noted,
however, that due process concerns also arise in the context of private delegation of
public power. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV.
201 (1937); Lawrence, supra note 107, at 672-95; George W. Liebmann, Delegation to
Private Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650 (1975).
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state program funded under this part."23 This provision seems to
foreclose conclusively any argument that there is a right to welfare
on behalf of needy families. In the aftermath of welfare reform,
commentators wondered what rights remained for poor individuals,
should they be subjected to discriminatory or arbitrary treatment by
the state.236 As one scholar has asked, "Should these rights [de-
scribed in Goldberg] disappear if the operation of the welfare pro-
cess is administered by a private agency having a contract with the
state ?"
23 7
The PRWORA disclaims any right or entitlement to public assis-
tance. However, the PRWORA does not eliminate, indeed cannot
eliminate, the protections due process accords to property interests.
In other words, Congress or a state legislature may declare that
there is no right to a specific benefit; yet once it grants the benefit,
it may not do so in a manner that denies due process to recipients.
Once one has a property interest, whether that interest is a job or a
welfare check, then that property interest cannot be taken away
without due process of law.238 The Supreme Court explained the
difference in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth: "Property
interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits."239 Once the feder-
1s Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 401(b) (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (1997)).
23 See, e.g., Laura C. Conway, Will Procedural Due Process Survive After Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Is Gone?, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 209 (1996).
237 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1169, 1185 (1995). Barak-Erez's main argument is that we must look to
contemporary understandings of the role of govemment and, following the "public func-
tion" test, evaluate whether the activity in question constitutes state action. See id. at
1181-82; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982).
1 As the Court explained in Goldberg, 'The constitutional challenge cannot be an-
swered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right."
397 U.S. at 262 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)); see also
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ('[T~he Court has fully and finally
rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to
govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.").
" 408 U.S. at 577; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Several
lower courts have ruled that the mandatory language of a statute gives rise to a claim
of entitlement. See, e.g., Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supp. Retirement Sys.
II, 91 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding claims to retirement benefits rooted in county
code); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1979) (interpreting language of
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al government allocates money into an individual's account via EFT,
or under the new TANF statute, due process governs the distribu-
tion of those benefits.24 Goldberg remains relevant because no
piece of legislation could override the constitutional due process
protections it articulated.2 4' Although Goldberg is commonly
viewed as the apex of the welfare rights movement, it did not pur-
port to establish a right to welfare. Goldberg's innovation was to
apply the requirements of due process to decisions of the state on
whether to grant, deny, or eliminate assistance. The Court held only
state statute requiring that "every city and county shall relieve and support all incompe-
tent, poor, indigent persons'); cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1983) (ruling, in
the context of a prison discipline procedure case, that mandatory language and statutory
standards create a protected interest).
24 For a similar argument, see Conway, supra note 236. The structure of the argu-
ment is also similar to that made by immigrants' rights advocates following the passage
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA).
Although IIRIRA eliminated many of the statutory routes for judicial review of decisions
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the basic constitutional remedy of habeas
corpus remains and cannot be abolished by statute. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651
(1996) (reaching same conclusion with respect to Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996); Lucas Guttentag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion-Statutory Restrictions and Constitutional Rights, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245 (1997);
see also Todd G. Cosenza, Preserving Procedural Due Process for Legal Immigrants Re-
ceiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2065 (1997) (contending that states must apply full constitutional safeguards for
immigrants seeking to qualify for Food Stamps based on narrow administrative excep-
tion). The difference is that habeas corpus is always available; due process protections
apply only in the event that a state or the federal govemment elects to provide welfare
benefits.
In a recent article, Richard Pierce contends that due process analysis is on the
wane. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1973 (1996). Pierce suggests that the first volley in the attack against a
broad understanding of due process is the Second Circuit's opinion in Colson v. Sillman,
35 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994), in which the court ruled that the termination of state medi-
cal services to disabled children did not entitle recipients to a pretermination hearing.
See Pierce, supra, at 1989-90. Yet Colson is a very thin thread upon which to hang this
argument. First, the language of the regulations at issue were highly discretionary, sug-
gesting that the benefit could be revoked at any time. See 35 F.3d at 108. Second, the
case was decided by a two-judge panel (the third panel member having recused himself
after oral argument) composed of conservative Reagan appointees. See id. at 106. As a
result, Colson is a weak indicator of an emerging legal consensus.
In contrast, the analysis of Goldberg remains relevant. Houseman suggests that
Goldberg's emphasis on due process means that while other leading welfare rights cases
have outlived their usefulness, "Goldberg may provide the most useful weapon to pover-
ty advocates in the 1990s and beyond to assure that the poor are treated fairly and
equitably by welfare administrators.' Houseman, supra note 34, at 836.
241 For an equal protection-based argument, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs
Don't Add Up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent
Welfare Reform Measures, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 1111 (1996).
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that, "Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them."242 It did not create an independent
source of entitlement or qualification.
Goldberg acquires heightened importance in an era of privat-
ization, moreover, because its balancing test analyzes governmental
interests, as distinct from private interests. Evaluating the state's
asserted interest in avoiding costly hearings while unqualified indi-
viduals continued to receive benefits, the Court held: "the interest
of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance,
coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneous-
ly terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to
prevent any increases in its fiscal and administrative burdens."
243
In Mathews v. Eldridge, which found that Social Security recipients
were not entitled to a pretermination hearing, 44 the Court ex-
plained that to determine what process is due, courts must balance
three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, includ-
ing the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.24s
The basic thrust of this test is to weigh the individual's right to
procedural protections, such as a hearing, against the governmental
interest in keeping costs down.
2G Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
23 Id. at 266. For an application of the Goldberg balancing test in the context of
child support enforcement, see Houseman, supra note 34, at 858.
244 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
14 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-71). The use of a
balancing test explains the divergent results in Goldberg, which held that benefit recip-
ients were entitled to a pretermination hearing, and Mathews, which held that they were
not. In Mathews, the agency making the determination was the Social Security Adminis-
tration, an arguably more reliable entity than the New York State welfare bureaucracy in
Goldberg. See MASHAW Er AL, supra note 27, at 273. For an argument that the balanc-
ing test of Mathews is on its way out, see Pierce, supra note 240, at 1999.
Some examples of cases applying the balancing test of Goldberg and Mathews
include Helter v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330-33 (1993) (upholding Kentucky's involuntary
commitment scheme); Bliek v. Palmer, 102 F.3d 1472, 1474-78 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding
that demand letter for Food Stamp recoupment failed to satisfy due process); and Ortiz
v. Eichler, 794 F.2d 889, 892-95 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding Delaware's pretermination no-
tice to AFDC recipients was constitutionally defective).
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In a privatized system of welfare administration, the govern-
mental interest is dramatically minimized. In Goldberg and
Mathews, the state interest was measured in terms of how due
process might disrupt the state agency's application or verification
procedures, whether state workers would need to devote time and
energy to the case, and how much of a financial burden due pro-
cess would impose. The Court in Mathews speaks repeatedly of
assessing "the public interest,"24 6 which requires the court to
weigh "the administrative burden and other societal costs"247 such
as the impact of due process on "public funds."248 The Court con-
cludes that "the Government's interest, and hence that of the pub-
lic, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a
factor that must be weighed."249
Where states have chosen to privatize their welfare systems, the
countervailing interest must now be measured in terms of the bur-
den on a private corporation. In most cases, the cost of due process
will come out of the private company's profit margin. Needless to
say, the state interest in operating a social services agency and
managing governmental funds is of far greater importance than
private profits. It is difficult to imagine any court giving the same
weight to the interests of Lockheed Martin or EDS as to the interests
of the State of California or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. A
court may reasonably defer to the state's decision that it will spend
less money on welfare services and more on public schooling or
local law enforcement. It would be irrational, however, for a court
to decide that maximizing returns to a private company's sharehold-
ers is more important than guaranteeing due process to individual
benefit recipients, particularly where the private corporation is
under contract to the state to provide benefits to needy individu-
als. 2"0 The standard arguments in favor of court deference to the
24 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 348.
2 Note that this argument does not suggest that benefit recipients should enjoy any
and all conceivable due process rights at the expense of the private company. In most
cases, the private company is under contract to provide welfare services and in return
the state promises a fixed amount of money. If the private corporation manages to oper-
ate the system so as to keep its costs below what the state pays out, it keeps the differ-
ence as profit. See infra note 330. When the administrative and financial burdens of
due process come out of that profit, the above analysis applies. When the administrative
and financial burdens of due process exceed the private company's profit, and begin to
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policy decisions of executive agencies no longer apply.
While one side of the equation has changed, the other has not.
Goldberg's analysis of the "brutal need" of benefit recipients re-
mains relevant. Quoting the lower court decision in the case, the
Supreme Court explained:
While post-termination review is relevant, there is one overpowering fact
which controls here. By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is without funds
or assets.... Suffice it to say that to cut off a welfare recipient in the face
of... "brutal need" without a prior hearing of some sort is unconsciona-
ble, unless overwhelming considerations justify it."1
Because private profits can hardly count as an overwhelming con-
sideration, welfare recipients alleging some violation of their con-
stitutional rights are entitled to greater due process protections
under a privatized welfare system, not fewer.5 2 Thus "it is possi-
ble to accept the economic reasons for the privatization of welfare
services (by contracting them out) and still recognize the importance
of safeguarding the due process rights of welfare recipients."5 3
The balancing test now greatly favors the claim made by the
recipient.
An advocate of privatization would find much to disagree with
in the preceding paragraphs. To the extent that privatizing state
functions is intended to save money and improve service delivery,
imposing potentially costly and complicated due process require-
ments will undermine these goals. Yet a private company cannot
expect to stand in the shoes of the state with respect to the state's
advantages without incurring any liabilities. It is simply not credible
to assert that the interests of the people of the State of Texas, for
example, are no greater than the interests of Transactive's sharehold-
ers, particularly where these interests are weighed against the "bru-
tal need" suffered by an individual whose benefits were wrongly
cut into the state's funds, then the ordinary Goldberg analysis applies: the interest of the
individual recipient is weighed against the governmental interest.
21 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899, 900.
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
"3 This certainly does not mean that benefit recipients are on the whole better off,
simply that their due process claims are stronger under a privatized welfare system. This
is in some way compensation for the likelihood that, in general, their experience under
a privatized system is likely to be unsatisfactory.
" Barak-Erez, supra note 237, at 1185.
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denied or cut off. A private corporation that operates the state's
welfare system assumes a great deal of authority; it should also be
prepared to shoulder the responsibility that comes with such power.
Having recognized that the balance in a privatized welfare
system will tip more frequently in favor of the claimant, the relevant
question becomes what process is due.54 As the Court noted in
Mathews, "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.'""' There are
three critical elements of due process to which benefit recipients
were entitled under Goldberg, and these claims remain viable. First,
claimants are entitled to the opportunity to apply for welfare and, if
qualified, to receive it.2"' There is a wide body of case law that
makes clear that there must be eligibility standards for benefit distri-
bution and that such standards must be followed." 7 Churning
jeopardizes this right, and the tendency of private service providers
to adopt churning policies suggests that the future holds greater dan-
ger. Second, claimants are entitled to fair notice of the private
agency's procedures and policies, as well as any action contemplat-
ed by the private provider that may affect the recipient's eligibility.
The right to adequate notice plays an instrumental role in securing
the most basic element of due process: the right to a fair hearing. As
the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "The fundamental
2"4 While the Constitution is the primary source of due process protections, it need
not be the only source. States are still likely to have their own benefit programs that
establish standards for eligibility and benefit delivery. Another source of protection would
be the guarantee of fair and open procedures established by federal and state adminis-
trative procedure acts. See Conway, supra note 236, at 213.
255 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
256 Summarizing a number of cases, the Seventh Circuit has explained that, 'Appli-
cants who have met the objective eligibility criteria of a wide variety of governmental
programs have been held to be entitled to protection under the due process clause."
Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1278 n.35 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Daniels v.
Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1984); Carey v. Quem, 588 F.2d 230 (7th
Cir. 1978).
s In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), the Court reasoned that 'the agency
must, at a minimum, let the standard be generally known so as to assure that it is
being applied consistently and so as to avoid both the reality and the appearance of
arbitrary denial of benefits to potential beneficiaries.' Id. at 231; see also Holmes v.
New York City Housing Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968); Grueschow v. Harris, 492
F. Supp. 419 (D.S.D. 1980) (finding that state had failed to provide adequate notice to
potential beneficiaries of energy assistance). The point was made most clearly in an
Illinois case: "Due process requires an evenhanded application of eligibility standards."
Brengola-Sorrentino v. Illinois Dept. of Pub. Aid, 472 N.E.2d 877, 881 (111. App. Ct.
1984).
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requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 258 As will be ar-
gued in more detail below, a private corporation engaged in social
service delivery has interests distinctly opposed to those of its "cli-
ents." Even the most hostile state bureaucracy did not have an in-
herently adversarial relationship with benefit recipients. Hearing
rights, with the same protections established in Goldberg, are
necessary to monitor and correct this tension.
These rights are significant not simply because they improve
the accuracy of agency determinations, but also because they fulfill
dignitary values. In his seminal article on due process, Judge Henry
Friendly set forth a number of different features of a procedure that
would satisfy due process: an unbiased court, notice of the pro-
posed action and the reasons therefore, an opportunity to respond,
the right to call witnesses, the right to know the evidence against
one's claim, the right to a decision based on the evidence, the right
to counsel, the right to a record, the right to receive a statement of
reasons for the decision, public attendance, and judicial review." 9
The increasing reliance on technology threatens to undermine these
dignitary values. A fair hearing may not be deemed necessary be-
cause "it could all be done automatically." One theorist has sug-
gested that "adoption of electronic information technology for
rulemaking, adjudication, internal management, and delivery of
services advances virtually all of the traditional goals of administra-
tive law."26 Claimants could simply present their case by comput-
er filing, the agency would file an electronic answer, and an adjudi-
cation management system would "automatically identify facts as to
which there is dispute."26 Such a procedure would likely be faster
and involve less paperwork, but it has several drawbacks. Beyond
2- Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)); see also Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 ("'he fundamental requisite of due process
of law is the opportunity to be heard.") (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914)).
259 See Henry J. Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
Judge Friendly's argument is not that all procedures must include each of these ele-
ments, but that in any given case, many of these rights will be present. Note that under
the Goldberg/Mathews balancing test, more of Judge Friendly's conditions are likely to
be required where the competing interest is the private corporation's rather than a gov-
ernmental interest.
260 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency and the Traditional Paradigms of Ad-
ministrative Law, 44 ADMIN. 1. REV. 79, 80 (1992).
261 Id. at 83.
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the fact that it presupposes broad public use, and perhaps owner-
ship, of computers, electronic adjudication would eliminate the in-
person aspect of a fair hearing. For many benefit recipients, the fair
hearing is the only time their claim is treated with any seriousness
by any state official.262 To eliminate this point of contact seems
unduly cruel.
The cost-cutting imperatives that drive privatized welfare are on
a collision course with the dignitary values protected by due pro-
cess. The remainder of this Section will demonstrate how the im-
pact of this collision can be contained. As a prudential matter, state
legislatures and the courts should review the operation of their
privatized programs carefully to ensure that private corporations are
not simply churning recipients or denying individuals adequate
opportunity to secure benefits for which they are qualified. Second,
the federal regulations governing the EBT program should be re-
vised to conform with federal law protecting all electronic transfer
account holders. Third, every decision of import made by the pri-
vate corporation should be reviewable by the state through a fair
hearing process.
B. The Demands of Due Process
1. The Right to Apply and Receive
Welfare privatizers have a strong economic incentive to churn
recipients. According to Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation,
the success of Wisconsin in reducing the number of cases was
largely attributable to "'application dissuasion,"' such that "'people
never even walk in the door in the first place.'"263 The impetus to
As Frank Michelman explains:
[T]he individual may have various reasons for wanting an opportunity to dis-
cuss the decision with the agent. Some pertain to external consequences: the
individual might succeed in persuading the agent away from the harmful ac-
tion. But again a participatory opportunity might also be psychologically impor-
tant to the individual: to have played a part in, to have made one's apt con-
tribution to, decisions which are about oneself may be counted important even
though the decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable
and one's efforts have not proved influential.
Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, 18 NO-
MOS 126, 127-28 U. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977). Even supporters
of electronic adjudication recognize that the dignitary value of adjudication could be
reduced. See Perritt, supra note 260, at 97.
' Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Cold, supra note 119, at 45. Intriguingly, advo-
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cut costs conflicts with the obligation to provide benefits to the
needy; private contractors usually motivated by profits are ill-suited
to meeting basic human needs that carry no price tag. As Judith
Gueron of the New York-based Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation pointed out, "'It's not like garbage collection. ""'2
Richard Scott, the CEO of Columbia/HCA Healthcare, owner of 350
hospitals in thirty-eight states, is a perfect example of how privatiza-
tion puts the wrong incentives into place. According to Scott,
"'Healthcare is a business just like anything else." His answer to
the need to assist benefit populations is likewise disturbing: "'Is any
fast-food restaurant obligated to feed everyone who shows up?"'26s
Such sentiments confirm the prediction made by a former Pennsyl-
vania commissioner of children, who stated that, "'It's a profit-mak-
ing feeding frenzy .... These corporations are growing helter-
skelter, without people who know the field or know kids." 266 It is
not persuasive to argue, as do Lockheed officials in Florida, that the
private contractor's financial benefit is dependent upon putting
people to work. By paying $450 to Lockheed for each person it
processes, whether or not the person finds a job, 67 Florida
encourages providers simply to churn cases.
In light of these incentives, there is a legitimate fear that once
private corporations assume control over the day-to-day workings of
state welfare bureaucracies, a variety of churning mechanisms will
cates of welfare privatization contend that, in addition to doing most everything else
wrong, the public sector fails to chum applicants efficiently. See id.
26 Quoted in Harwood, supra note 7, at 21. As one state welfare executive elaborat-
ed: "Sometimes we have difficulty understanding each other. . . The cultures are so
different. We don't look at the bottom line." Id. Ira Colby, chair of the University of
Central Florida's social work department, concurs: "'i'm really concerned about putting a
corporate mentality into anti-poverty programs.'" Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1.
" Carl Ginsburg, The Patient as Profit Center: Hospital Inc. Comes to Town, THE
NATION, Nov. 18, 1996, at 18; see also Sawicky, supra note 5, at 21 ("Both advocates
and critics agree that contractors are motivated by financial incentives in contracts, not
by the missions of government policies.).
"A Bemstein, supra note 112, at 1 (quoting Paul DeMuro). In New Jersey, child
welfare officials proposed to turn over foster care placement, therapy, and adoption
services for abused and neglected children to a private for-profit business. See Brett
Pulley, New Jersey Considers Privatizing Its Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1996,
§ 1, at 21. One child advocate objected, "'If you're going to introduce a profit margin
into a system that's already underfunded, I think you can pretty easily imagine the types
of shortcuts that will occur, which will have a devastating impact on the children." Id.
(quoting Marcia Robinson Lowry, Executive Director, Children's Rights Inc. in New York
city).
I" See Kunerth, supra note 116, at H1.
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determine which individuals receive assistance and which do not.
The most basic form of dissuasion is to make it difficult for recipi-
ents to access services. The classic example is "locating a welfare
office several bus rides out of town and opening it at odd and errat-
ic hours."2 8 Allowing benefits to be accessed at any ATM termi-
nal certainly expands access, but possibilities for dissuasion remain.
One significant problem with dispensing benefits through ATM
machines is that ATMs are difficult to find in poor neighborhoods
that have largely been abandoned by banks.269 If banks refuse to
open ATMs in poor neighborhoods, or if retailers serving poor
neighborhoods cannot afford POS terminals, then transmitting bene-
fits via EBT is not much of an innovation."' Further, a largely un-
recognized fact of American poverty is that almost thirty percent of
the poor live in rural areas.27 An ATM-based solution makes little
sense in counties where banks, much less ATMs, are few and far
between.272 It is true that one advantage of EBT is that it delivers
benefits through a "mainstream" technology, yet this technology is
less familiar to certain recipient populations.
Even if beneficiaries are able to access EBT services, benefits
might be available only on limited terms. As other commentators
have pointed out, there are a vast number of highly technical ques-
tions with significant bearing on the individual rights of welfare
recipients. Will withdrawals be limited to ATM terminals, or may
recipients also withdraw funds from POS terminals? Are beneficia-
ries limited to specific amounts that they may withdraw? Is the
maximum amount set per withdrawal, per week, or per month?
Does the maximum include transaction fees? Will participation in
the EBT program be mandatory? What if a benefit recipient would
prefer the old paper system? Will the state select PIN numbers?
What reporting requirements must be followed by the recipient?
What happens if the recipient exceeds a maximum withdrawal or is
suspected of fraud?273
20 Ehrenreich, Spinning the Poor Into Gold, supra note 119, at 45.
269 See Rowland, supra note 169, at A01.
270 See Buettner, supra note 172, at 1 ('Deployment of machines in low-income
neighborhoods tends to be pretty low . . . . Most banks do not have their branches in
low-income neighborhoods.'") (quoting Zy Weinberg, Director, Inner City Food Access
Program).
271 See Ellwood, supra note 10.
272 See Capelouto, supra note 175 (noting that there are no ATMs anywhere in Baker
County, Georgia).
273 Leyser lists eleven concems with EBT: recipients should be able to choose to use
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EBT systems should not be established and operated to turn a
profit, but to deliver benefits in a user-friendly way. Each time the
system is made more difficult to operate, the likelihood of applica-
tion dissuasion goes up. Each time the private provider or the state
conditions benefits on a seemingly minor administrative matter, the
potential for churning is increased.
Federal Food Stamp regulations address many of the practical
concerns raised by EBT, and in several cases resolve them satisfacto-
rily. 4 The federal Food Stamp EBT regulations prohibit the states
from implementing programs unless the system is first able to autho-
rize benefits properly, the state has trained households and others in
system usage, and information on the operation of such system has
been provided to the recipient populations."' However, the feder-
al requirements do not apply to the full universe of EBT programs,
leaving the states discretion to enact conflicting policies. New
Jersey, for example, allows the recipient three withdrawals before
the state will deduct a transaction fee for each subsequent with-
drawal." 6 This policy is troubling for several reasons. First, the
general federal policy, reflected in the Food Stamp regulations, is
not to deduct transaction fees. 7 Second, of all the penalties to
impose on the poor, a financial penalty is most cruel and counter-
productive. Third, many people have difficulty limiting their ATM
withdrawals to only three per month; at least once per week, or
four to five times a month, would be more reasonable. Finally, one
purported advantage of EBT is that it reduces theft by reducing the
EBT, rather than have it forced upon them; transaction fees should be federally regulated
if not outright prohibited; recipients should be able to select their own Personal Identifi-
cation Number (PIN); hearing and other rights should be made clear to recipients; there
must be an adequate number of access devices; accommodation must be made for peo-
ple with disabilities or facility in a language other than English; there should be oppor-
tunity for training; there must be policies protecting recipients in the event their card is
lost or stolen; procedures must be put in place for handling complaints; adequate back-
up systems must be put into place; and EBT recipients should get receipts after every
transaction. See Leyser, supra note 164, at 1-44; see also Budnitz, supra note 86, at
763-64.
274 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(e)(1)(ii) (1998) (allowing recipients to select their own
PIN number); id. § 274.12(h)(4)(i)(G) (requiring EBT systems to comply with the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act).
271 See 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(e)(1)(i)-(viii).
276 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-75(c)(1) (West 1998) ('[A]fter three free cash automatic
teller machine withdrawals in a month, the department may deduct a transaction fee
from a recipient's account for each subsequent withdrawal . . .).
2 See 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(0(1) ("[N]o transaction fees shall be imposed on food stamp
households utilizing the EBT system to access their benefits.').
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amount of money a needy individual must carry around on their
person. Limiting the number of withdrawals means that individuals
must take out more money on each occasion, thus making them
more attractive targets for theft. Louisiana has run into difficulty, as
explained above, in persuading private welfare providers to pay
transaction fees. Faced with opposition from retailers, the state
decided to impose the fees on individual recipients.27
These practical concerns, while significant, pale in comparison
to the bottom-line issue: delivering benefits in a timely manner. The
problem with late or faulty benefit delivery is that receiving benefits
on time often is, as Goldberg suggests, literally a matter of life and
death. So far, private corporate providers have stumbled over this
responsibility. Maximus' operation of Connecticut's entire program
of child-care benefits for families on welfare and the working poor
turned out to be a disaster. Hundreds of families were denied aid
solely due to Maximus' incompetent administration.279 This "ad-
ministrative chaos" arose when Maximus "failed to process thou-
sands of applications in time to get the checks out to parents and
care providers."28° Over a three-day period in October 1997 the
company's service center received 35,000 phone calls from people
whose benefits had failed to materialize.28' In Massachusetts, the
EBT system crashed for a few hours on the day benefits were
due.282 In Colorado, debit machines denied sales even though
beneficiaries had a positive Food Stamp or cash balance in the
system.28 The computer system Andersen Consulting set up in
Texas erroneously puts random holds on child support checks.2
Because of the repeated failure of the Andersen Consulting system,
only twenty percent of child support payments are made on
time.28 These operational complaints come not only from recipi-
218 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 231.13 (West 1997) ("Retailers participating in the cash
assistance electronic benefits transfer system are not prohibited from charging or assess-
ing a fee against cash assistance recipients who are accessing benefits for the sole pur-
pose of obtaining cash.').
279 See Jonathan Rabinovitz, In Connecticut, a Privately Run Welfare Program Sinks
Into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at B1.
28 Id.
281 See id.
211 See Rowland, supra note 169, at A01. But see Emilie Astell, Welfare by Plastic
Weathers Glitches, TELEGRAM & GAZE=rE, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al (noting that system was
eventually fixed following early problems).
21 See Goins, supra note 184, at 1A.
214 See McDonald, supra note 125, at A2.
285 See id. (citing General Accounting Office study).
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ents: Louisiana retailers have often faulted Deluxe Data, the private
contractor that operates Louisiana's EBT system, for being unrespon-
sive to implementation problems.28 As noted above, a computer
failure on Deluxe's part caused an "EBT meltdown" in seven states,
during which recipients were unable to use their cards. 287 In
Rhode Island, only one-third of the grocers that will accept the
cards have the necessary electronic equipment.288 These are omi-
nous signs. Expressing his suspicion of EBT, Maine's Social Services
Commissioner explained: "'The landscape across the country is
littered with large, expensive computerization systems that private
companies provided to states. When they didn't work out and
failed, these private providers went back home, and the states were
left with the pieces.'" 289 A system that frequently fails, out of ne-
glect or carelessness, stigmatizes those who rely on it. In this way,
an EBT card becomes a poor person's passport, the key to an unreli-
able and unpredictable source of support.
It is unlikely that mere incompetence on the part of a service
provider would violate due process.2' However, a cause of action
may arise from administrative dissuasion, onerous application or
receipt procedures, and bureaucratic disentitlement.29' Prelimi-
narily, policies that seek to dissuade or churn recipients fall afoul of
the line of cases requiring benefit provision to follow ascertainable
standards. A program that provides benefits to single mothers with
an annual income of less than $7000 cannot be operated to provide
benefits to single mothers with an annual income of less than
28 See Marsha Shuler, Task Force to Contact Contractor, BATON ROUGE ADvOC., Oct.
1, 1997, at 10A.
27 See supra note 185.
288 See Rowland, supra note 169, at A01.
28 Kunerth, supra note 116, at Hi (quoting Kevin Concannon, Commissioner, Maine
Department of Social Services). Welfare administration is not the only area in which
technical glitches have seriously affected program operation and interfered with people's
rights. A new machine developed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to pro-
duce 'fraudproof' green cards has malfunctioned so badly as to hold up green cards for
78,000 qualified applicants. See Deborah Sontag, Many Green Cards Delayed by 'Bugs'
in a New Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
On the other hand, the EBT regulations may create a right to timely benefit avail-
ability: "'The State agency shall insure that the EBT system complies with the expedited
service benefit delivery standard and the normal application processing standards ... 
7 C.F.R. § 274.12(f)(8) (1998).
29, State statutes, for example, may create such rights. See, e.g., CAL WELF. & INST.
CODE § 10071 (West 1998) ('Any benefits provided to recipients under the department's
authority may be distributed through the electronic benefits transfer system as long as
the recipient has reasonable access to his or her benefits.') (emphasis added).
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$7000 who show up at 5 AM on the first Thursday of the month to
stand in line at the welfare center.292
More importantly, the necessity for such practices and proce-
dures must be weighed against the brutal need experienced by
beneficiaries. While a state interest in more effective, streamlined,
or efficient procedures might outweigh the consequent harms inflict-
ed upon recipients, the private interest must be much more substan-
tial. To borrow from the language of equal protection analysis, an
onerous bureaucratic procedure might not deny due process if
rationally related to a legitimate state interest, but the very same
procedure could violate due process unless it is strictly necessary to
achieve a compelling private interest. As noted above, it is one
thing for the courts to compel the state to spend its resources on
pretermination hearings. The Mathews Court recognized the trade-
offs such compulsion would involve: "Significantly, the cost of
protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has
identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come
out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any
particular program of social welfare are not unlimited." 293  The
same caution need not, and should not, be .exercised when cutting
into Lockheed's profit margin. Hence beneficiaries under a priva-
tized welfare system may justifiably claim that the agency's tenden-
cy to make erroneous determinations supports a right to
pretermination hearings, 94 the consistent failure to deliver benefits
on time supports a right to emergency assistance, and the compara-
tive cost of paying transaction fees suggests that this burden should
fall on the provider, not the recipient.
22 See, e.g., Perez v. Lavine, 412 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Court estab-
lished in Morton that, 'This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual
rights and obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with
the goveming legislation, but also to employ procedures that conform to the law.' Mor-
ton v. Ruiz, 415- U.S. 199, 232 (1974) (citations omitted). This principle clearly prevents
agencies from engaging in churning, even chuming on the basis of ostensibly reasonable
qualifications: "No matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particu-
lar decision might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc
basis by the dispenser of the funds.' Id.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
Mashaw suggests that the tendency of state welfare bureaucracies to commit er-
rors, compared to the relative competence of the Social Security Administration, explains
why Goldberg required a pretermination hearing in the first case, but Mathews required
none in the latter. See MASHAW ET AL., supra note 27, at 273.
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2. The Right to Fair Notice
A second critical component of due process is notice.29' The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that, "An essential princi-
ple of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case."'2 96 The low level protections accorded to
benefit recipients under the federal EBT regulations, however, deny
these individuals "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.' 297  Because the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act and its enforcing regulations secure appropriate due
process protections, this framework should replace the current
regulations governing EBT.
In the developing law of electronic cash, the federal regulation
that requires providers to supply adequate notice to account holders
is known as Regulation E.29 Regulation E establishes a set of pro-
cedures for error resolution, resolution of liability questions, and
information sharing that enables account holders to monitor wheth-
er their funds are being kept properly. Initially, the Federal Reserve
Board suggested that the protections of Regulation E would extend
to EBT, explaining that "'EBT transactions fit the definition of elec-
tronic funds transfers and must be covered by the same rules."'299
However, the PRWORA provided that EBT programs established
under state or local law would be excluded from Regulation E."°
S See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (holding that due process requires
'some kind of notice').
I Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); see also LaChance v.
Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753, 756 (1998) ("The core of due process is the right to notice
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.').
"7 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965)).
1 Regulation E provides consumer protections pursuant to the Electronic Fund Trans-
fer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1996).
I Quoted in Barbara A. Rehm, States Seek Protection from Fraud Liability on Elec-
tronic Benefits, AM. BANKER, Mar. 28, 1996, at 2.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 825(a)(3) (1996) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i)) ('Disclosures,
protections, responsibilities, and remedies established by the Federal Reserve Board under
section 904 of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act shall not apply to benefits delivered
under this Act through any electronic benefit transfer system.'). The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act now provides that, 'The disclosures, protections, responsibilities, and reme-
dies established under this subchapter, and any regulation prescribed or order issued by
the Board in accordance with this subchapter, shall not apply to any electronic benefit
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In August 1997, the Federal Reserve Board developed regulations
that specifically exempt "needs-tested benefits in a program estab-
lished under state or local law or administered by a state or local
agency."" 1 This decision is particularly odd in that federal bene-
fits, or pooled accounts, still get the protection of Regulation E, but
state benefit programs do not. As a result, different federal regula-
tions govern state distribution of Food Stamps and state-adminis-
tered cash benefits through EBT programs.
The rights enjoyed by beneficiaries under the Food Stamp EBT
regulations are distinctly inferior to those of Regulation E. Writing
in 1993, two analysts, then at the Center on Social Welfare Policy
and Law, found four different areas in which Regulation E offered
protections superior to the EBT regulations, three of which will be
addressed below. 2 While financial institutions need not comply
with each specific provision of Regulation E in administering gov-
ernment fund accounts, the protections for such individuals are
substantially similar °. 3" Even if the financial institution does the
minimum amount necessary to comply, Regulation E offers far great-
er protection than EBT regulations. Part of the reason is that "Regu-
lation E works as a built-in contract whose terms cannot be negotiat-
ed, placing an uneducated recipient on a somewhat more equal bar-
gaining level with the government provider."3 ' The EBT regula-
tions, by contrast, allow states and private banks to impose
inequitable conditions.
transfer system . . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(2)(B).
Advocates for the poor had tried to extend the safeguards of Regulation E to EBT,
but to no avail. See 142 CONG. REc. S8395-04 Uuly 31, 1996) ('Clearly, it is unfair to
deny reasonable safeguards to welfare beneficiaries.') (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy
(D-MA)).
1 12 C.F.R. § 205.15(a)(1) (1998); see Fed Frees States, Locals from EBT Compliance
with Reg E, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14, 1997, at 17. The private sector opposed the expan-
sion of EBT largely on the basis of cost. See Pulliam, supra note 164, at 531-32.
3 See Leyser & Blong, supra note 164, at 421-24. Leyser and Blong also explain
that Regulation E imposes a fourth requirement that most ATM consumers take for grant-
ed-a printed receipt for every transaction. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.9. Since Leyser and
Blong wrote, however, similar requirements were set up in the context of Food Stamp
EBT systems, see 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(0(3), yet the regulations do not provide for balance
inquiries without a withdrawal. For an early treatment of the issues raised by EBT in the
context of consumer protection, see Leymaster, supra note 195. For the most up-to-date
analysis of problems with EBT, see Leyser, supra note 164.
o See 12 C.F.R. § 205.15.
Budnitz, supra note 86, at 765.
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First, Regulation E is preferable in that it limits the liability of
recipients for unauthorized transactions. An account user is liable
only if the financial institution has disclosed its procedures for unau-
thorized transfers, and if so, the consumer is only liable for $50 if
he or she gives two days notice of the transfer, or up to $500 if
timely notice was not given."' Furthermore, if the consumer dis-
covers the unauthorized transfer by examining his or her statement,
the consumer has sixty days within which to give notice."° In
light of the vulnerability of benefit populations to theft, which in
theory was part of the reason to adopt an EBT-based delivery sys-
tem, it makes little sense that the EBT regulations do not account for
the threat of theft by establishing similar standards for liability. 7
Under the EBT regulations, the state agency assumes liability for lost
or stolen benefits only when the recipient reports that the card or
PIN number has been lost or stolen.308 As the theft of a card may
not be immediately apparent, an individual recipient may lose a
great deal of money before he or she realizes that the card has been
stolen. Because certain states impose restrictions on the number of
withdrawals one may make from an EBT account, a beneficiary may
not use his or her card frequently and thus may not notice that it
has disappeared.
Second, Regulation E requires the account holding institution to
provide disclosure of the terms and conditions of the account.
Recipients are entitled to disclosure as to fees, services, extent of
liability, and processes for stopping payment and error resolu-
tion.309 The error resolution notice must be sent to each consumer
once per calendar year.310 These disclosures must be "clear and
readily understandable, in writing, and in a form the consumer may
keep." 311 If an EBT beneficiary has some concern about the accu-
racy of his account statements, or believes the financial institution is
acting inappropriately, he or she should at least have access to the
rules to make such a claim properly. The EBT regulations, by con-
trast, require only that printed receipts be issued at the time of
transaction. 2 Receipts are useful, but hardly a substitute for the
3 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
3 Id. § 205.6(b)(3).
307 See Budnitz, supra note 86, at 770-71 (noting problem of unauthorized transfers).
3' 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(f)(5)(iv) (1998).
3 12 C.F.R. § 205.7(b)(1)-(10) (1998).
310 Id. § 205.8(b).
3, Id. § 205.4(a).
311 See 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(0(3). These receipts must comply with Regulation E's dis-
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complete picture afforded by periodic statements. Nor would re-
ceipts alone be of much use to an individual beneficiary in a fair
hearing who sought to prove that funds due to him or her were
never deposited into the account, or that other funds had been
stolen without his or her knowledge, or that the state agency had
wrongfully recouped EBT benefits. The failure to provide beneficia-
ries with a full picture of their accounts makes it virtually impossible
to challenge adverse state action. The beneficiary simply lacks
adequate information.
Third, Regulation E's procedures for error resolution are superi-
or to the federal Food Stamp EBT regulations. This area is especially
important because so many fair hearings turn on asserted agency
error.313 Regulation E sets up an error rectification procedure, with
specific periods for giving notice and conducting an investigation,
concluding with a written explanation of the financial institution's
decision." 4 Federal EBT reconciliation provisions, on the other
hand, are geared toward protecting the state's interest in knowing
where the money goes, not protecting individual recipients'
rights." ' The recipient lacks the ability to challenge the statement
when necessary. All information is in the hands of the private finan-
cial institution, and without the protections afforded by Regulation
E, individual benefit recipients have no way to correct or evaluate
such data. A subsidiary issue to error resolution is recoupment. In
the event that the providing agency believes that it has erroneously
allocated funds to an individual recipient, what are the appropriate
remedies? An EBT system allows the private bank to withdraw mon-
ey immediately and without notice. 6 In the current paper-based
closure conditions. See id. § 274.12(f)(3)(ii). The regulations do provide that participant
may request a written 60-day transaction history, see id. § 274.12 (0(1), but no provi-
sion mandates that they be informed of this right.
313 Such error is simply the nature of the beast in dealing with huge computer data-
bases. See William M. Bulkeley, Databases Are Plagued by Reign of Error, WALL ST. J.,
May 26, 1992, at B6.
314 12 C.F.R. § 205.11.
3s 7 C.F.R. § 274.12.
3" The USDA has proposed amending the Food Stamp regulations to allow automatic
deductions from an EBT account with contemporaneous, rather than advance, notice. See
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,511 (proposed May 19, 1998). This is
already a problem in the states. See Leymaster, supra note 195, at 721 (describing re-
coupment without notice in Cuyahoga County, Ohio). Minnesota allows the agency or
bank to immediately deduct the amount from the account. See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 256D.06 (West 1998). Proposed legislation in Texas provides that the agency
"shall . . . use private collection agents to collect reimbursements for benefits granted by
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system, notice must precede recoupment, allowing the beneficiary
an opportunity to contest the agency action.
The final reason Regulation E is superior to the federal Food
Stamp EBT regulations is that the latter fail to require a periodic
statement of the amount of money in the account. The contractors'
opposition to sending out such statements motivated the Federal
Reserve Board to exempt EBT accounts from this requirement of
Regulation E.317 Once again, according second-class treatment to
the accounts of poor and low-income individuals undermines the
"mainstreaming" aim of EBT: "Because recipients are on a tight bud-
get, one of the most important items of information recipients need
is the balance in their account so they can be sure they have
enough for necessities.""' It is difficult to compel individuals to
be "responsible" while denying them the necessary tools." 9 Regu-
lation E would have furthered the ability of low-income recipients
to plan their financial affairs; it required a periodic statement for
each monthly cycle in which an electronic fund transfer has oc-
curred, or a quarterly periodic statement if no transfer occurred,
setting forth the same information most account holders get on their
statements every month.20
The likely response to an argument for heightened due process
rights for recipients of EBT, commensurate with Regulation E, is that
these benefits are welfare-a handout-not somebody's hard-earned
the department in error . . . . TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 31.001 (West 1998),
amended by 1997 TEX. SESS. LAW SERV. 75th Leg., ch. 1153, § 1.08 (West).
311 See Fed Frees States, supra note 301, at 17.
3" Budnitz, supra note 86, at 766.
319 See CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 10065(b) (West 1998) ("The goals of electronic
benefit transfer are . . . to afford public social services recipients the opportunity to
better and more securely manage their financial affairs.').
It is worth asking whether the inappropriate requirements of the EBT regulations
could support an argument that the regulations amount to "unconstitutional conditions"
imposed on benefit receipt. For arguments tending to support this claim, see Lynn A.
Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990); Julie A. Nice, In the Context of Welfare and Reproductive
Rights: Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Welfare, The Dangers of
Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72 DENV. U.
L. REV. 971 (1995); Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House? Welfare Re-
form and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (1995).
This claim is unlikely to succeed, however, because these regulations do not clearly
infringe on any of the rights commonly asserted in unconstitutional conditions cases,
such as freedom of religion. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
311 See 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(b) (1998).
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money. It could be argued that if the government is merely giving
people money, these funds should not be treated the same way as
ordinary bank accounts.32' This argument is faulty. Whether or not
government benefits sent to an electronic account constitute a prop-
erty interest in the same way that depositing a paycheck does is a
separate question from the question of what process is due.322 The
property interest vests once the federal or state government estab-
lishes a benefit program,323 and once the property interest vests,
due process applies. The second-class due process protections of
the federal Food Stamp EBT regulations should therefore be
replaced by Regulation E.324
3. The Right to be Heard
The delegation of state authority to administer a welfare system
raises a number of due process concerns. The most obvious objec-
3I EBT will deposit benefits into existing bank accounts for Food Stamp and TANF
participants. See, e.g., 305 ILL CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-3.1 (West 1998). Hence there is
some ambiguity as to whether EBT funds are like assets in any bank account. See
Pulliam, supra note 164, at 533-38, 541-43. Under federal law, benefits may be carried
over from month to month. See 7 C.F.R. § 274.12(e)(2)(vi). On the other hand, thebalance escheats to the state upon the death of the account holder. See, e.g., HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-39.5 (Michie 1997).
" The Court has frequently drawn comparisons between welfare benefits and em-
ployment rights to suggest that, at least in due process analysis, these claims are compa-
rable. In Roth, the Court ruled that, 'Just as the welfare recipients' 'property' interest in
welfare payments was created and defined by statutory terms, so the respondent's
'property' interest in employment . . . was created and defined by the terms of his
appointment.' Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
Other types of benefits also fall into the same category of due process protections such
that a prerevocation hearing is required. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)(parole); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (consumer goods); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(wages).
" In Roth, the Court explained the necessary showing for an entitlement: "To have
a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need
or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.' 408 U.S. at 577. The legitimate
claim of entitlement in this case arises from the statutory definition of the eligible class
of beneficiaries. See supra note 257.
324 While the provisions of Regulation E provide an appropriate framework for EBT,
not every consumer protection provision of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA')
should be adopted in the EBT context. For example, EFTA includes a treble damages
provision that applies when the financial institution fails to recredit the consumer's ac-
count within a certain period after an error has been discovered. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693f
(e) (1998). Hence, the policy recommendations of this Article are limited to
Regulation E.
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tion, that a state legislature may not delegate certain duties or re-
sponsibilities, lacks firm constitutional support. 2' The more signifi-
cant danger is that privatizing welfare involves a grant of govern-
mental authority to a financially interested party to make determina-
tions affecting individual rights. As one theorist puts it: "The con-
cern is that governmental power-power coercive in nature-will be
used to further the private interests of the private actor, as opposed
to some different public interest."326 As the analysis of the next
few paragraphs demonstrates, it would violate the Due Process
Clause to have a private company determine with finality which
individuals were entitled to benefits and whether benefits were
improperly denied. The state must retain oversight responsibility,
which would include a right to appeal adverse determinations in
individual cases and to pre-enforcement review of general policies.
The PRWORA eliminated the statutory right to a fair hearing. 27
Yet, by allowing a financially interested party to provide benefits,
privatization creates a need for safeguards to protect the due pro-
cess rights to which an individual beneficiary is entitled.
Dispute resolution in a privatized welfare system may take
many forms. The least problematic possibility is that the present
system of state administrative hearings, with right of appeal to state
court, would remain. On this model, the private corporation simply
doles out benefits without the power to enforce any individual or
policy decisions. It is unlikely that privatization programs would
adopt this model, however, because it denies the private provider
any say in benefit distribution which, after all, is where the savings
are expected. A more likely scenario is that the private provider has
the power to make initial determinations of eligibility for, or termi-
s TheN Court abandoned the so-called "nondelegation doctrine' long ago. See
MASHAW Er AL, supra note 27, at 55. Only on the state level is there much activity
relating to this doctrine, and even there the case law is inconsistent. See Lawrence,
supra note 107, at 650. Nor does a slightly different version of this argument, that
governmental services must be performed by govemrnmental workers, carry much weight.
In Corwin v. Farrell, 100 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 1951), the New York Court of Appeals
explained that 'neither constitutional mandate nor statutory enactment requires that all
services furnished or all labor performed for a governmental agency must be supplied by
persons directly employed.' Id. at 138; see also Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Munici-
pal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 41, 43-45 (1995).
For an analysis of the irrelevance of the nondelegation doctrine in the case of
privatized correctional facilities, see Warren Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's
Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 382-84 (1997).
326 Lawrence, supra note 107, at 659.
327 Fair hearing rights formerly were delineated at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1994).
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nation of, benefits, subject to appeal to state administrative agencies
or state court. Texas, for example, planned to contract out the gath-
ering of information to establish eligibility while leaving the actual
determination of eligibility in the hands of state employees. This
division raises issues of procedural fairness, as well as the question
of who has substantive control over these decisions.28
The basic problem with a private corporation delivering welfare
services is not just that it is likely to deny benefits even to qualified
recipients, but that its fiduciary obligations incline it to do so. Be-
cause a publicly traded company has a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder profits, the private provider will seek to maximize prof-
its even if it means harming the needy. 29 Texas's plan, for exam-
ple, would have required the successful bidder and operator to
provide services at $560 million annually. If they operated below
this amount, they would pocket the difference.3 For this reason
child welfare experts, for example, allege that "for-profits have a
financial duty to place the interests of their shareholders ahead of
what is best for children, and that states are ill prepared to hold
such companies accountable."33' Even the best intentioned corpo-
ration thus has a private interest in the outcome of any and all
determinations of benefits.
The Supreme Court has established that financially interested
parties cannot exercise ultimate authority over individual rights.
Back in the days of Prohibition, the Court upheld a challenge
brought by a bootlegger against Ohio's system of criminal fines in
liquor cases."' An Ohio law appointed local mayors as judges in
criminal trials to determine whether the defendant bootlegger
should be fined. In Tumey v. Ohio, the Court struck down this
arrangement on the ground that because the mayors' cities would
benefit from the fines imposed, the mayors could not act as neutral
arbiters.3 In doing so, the Court set forth the basic rule against
financial interestedness that is of paramount relevance to the current
debate on privatization:
328 See Sawicky, supra note 5, at 21.
319 See Bernstein, supra note 130, at 1 (citing Henry A. Freedman, Executive Director,
Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law).
330 See John Carlin, How to Profit from the Poor, INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 29,
1996, at 12.
31' Bernstein, supra note 130, at 1.
332 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
333 See id. at 512.
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It certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant
in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or property
to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his
case.
334
Other cases have emphasized that the principle of financial disinter-
estedness is rooted in the Due Process Clause.335 In the context of
welfare rights, Goldberg suggests that the matter is not even open to
question: "of course, an impartial decision maker is essential." 3 6
Significantly, the protection against financial disinterestedness
applies not only against state authority, but also private power. In
Gibson v. Berryhill, the Court invalidated the regulatory powers of a
state optometry board because the board was composed of private
practitioners, ruling that, "those with a substantial pecuniary interest
in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes."337 This
line of reasoning also emerged in two critical civil procedure cases
invalidating prejudgment remedies: Fuentes v. Shevin, which struck
down a Florida statute allowing a plaintiff to seize the property of a
defendant before the latter could appear before a judge;338 and
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., which allowed prejudgment
garnishment of a defendant's wages.339 The Court noted in both
3- Id. at 523. The Court elaborated: "Every procedure which would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law." Id. at
532. The rule that no man may be a judge in his own case has ancient origins, and
became part of the Anglo-American common law in 1608, when Chief Justice Coke
upheld the right of a graduate of Cambridge University to practice medicine without the
approval of judicial representatives of a monopoly conferred on the graduates of Uni-
versity College, London. See Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
652 (K.B. 1610).
311 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (upholding dismissal of employ-
ee from nonprobationary job in the Office of Economic Opportunity); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972) (invalidating trial for traffic offenses before town
mayor, whose court provided a substantial portion of the fines).
11 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
317 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
3m 407 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1972) ([N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo
the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process
had already occurred.").
339 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969) (noting that even a temporary loss of wages could
lead to poverty or "drive a wage-eaming family to the wall"); see also Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 264 (citing Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42).
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cases that these remedies were not per se impermissible, only that
the potential harms to defendants were so serious that a disinterest-
ed judge should exercise preenforcement review over their exercise.
In short, while the PRWORA stripped away fair hearing rights,
the role of private welfare provision requires fair hearing rights to
be reinstituted.3 40 Because every decision of import made by a pri-
vate provider potentially furthers corporate profits at the expense of
beneficiaries, every eligibility decision, termination of benefits,
change in status, or implementation of a general policy rule should
be appealable when made by a private corporation. As in Goldberg,
the elements of the hearing should include timely and adequate
notice; an opportunity to defend oneself by presenting arguments,
evidence, and witnesses; the right to counsel if so desired; an im-
partial decision-maker; a decision based solely on legal rules; and a
statement of reasons.3 41  Privatized welfare does not yet offer
anything close to these protections.
Instituting fair hearing rights for rule-making is an expansion of
the hearing rights allowed prior to PRWORA, but a logical one:
"One settled element of procedural due process is that the decision-
maker must not be personally biased, that he must make his deci-
sion according to established standards or a disinterested view of
the public interest."342 Put simply, a private entity cannot deter-
mine whether an individual recipient is entitled to benefits because
it has too great a financial stake in the answer. As noted above,
many private providers of welfare benefits are paid in part based on
how many cases they close. In light of this fact, it is rather obvious
how most claims alleging wrongful termination of benefits would
o Thus, while it is correct to say that, 'Unlike the AFDC statute, the Personal Re-
sponsibility Act does not explicitly grant applicants the right to appeal a denial of bene-
fits,' Conway, supra note 236, at 220, the fact that there are private providers does
impose appeal requirements. For other arguments in support of expanding due process
hearing rights in the context of privatized systems, see Lawrence, supra note 107, at
691; Ratliff, supra note 325, at 388-90.
" See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 325, 332 n.4 (1976); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at
266-71. While it is true that [Jin only one case, [Goldberg], has the Court required a
full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to adverse governmental action,' Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985), the protected interest in Goldberg is
the same as the protected interest in this case.
342 Lawrence, supra note 107, at 661; see also Ratliff, supra note 325, at 388 ("If a
financial conflict of interest would disqualify an elected legislator or executive official,
then procedural 'fairness' or 'impartiality' should surely prevent mere administrative regu-
lators from participating in rulemaking decisions in which they have a personal financial
stake.' (footnote omitted)).
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fare. Even nonfinal decisions should be appealable to a neutral state
arbiter, because the corporation could make a great deal of money
through delay. The claimant might give up, and even if the claimant
ultimately wins, the corporation can earn interest from the money
while the case is pending.43
It may seem paradoxical that privatization would require a
more prominent role for the state in protecting individual rights;
after all, isn't privatization supposed to mean less government?
However, by injecting the problem of financial interestedness into
benefit provision, privatization heightens the level of rights
protections required under the Due Process Clause. Review by state
court also promotes accountability and ensures that the private
corporation maintains an appropriate balance between its fiduciary
obligations to shareholders and its obligations to the client popula-
tions it contracted to serve. "Privatization reduces accountability.
Governments can be voted out, but private owners are insulated
from the opinions of ordinary citizens and contractors are protected
by legal agreements." 3" These protections also ensure that states
will not adopt draconian, unjust, or irrational welfare laws and then
lay the blame at the feet of a legally immune private corporation. A
private corporation may operate a welfare system with greater speed
and efficiency; however,
The Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.
Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficien-
cy and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials
no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.34
As objectionable as it may be to insulate private corporations from
public opinion, insulating private corporations from public rights is
even more noxious. Resurrecting the system of fair hearings over
virtually all determinations of import made by a private welfare
provider may seem drastic. This solution, however, is justified by
- In the EBT context, the institution gets the 'float,' the interest that accumulates
while the funds are being disputed. See Leymaster, supra note 195, at 726.
34 Herman, supra note 122, at 10; see also Lawrence, supra note 107, at 660 ('But
society probably relies most fundamentally on the political process, on its ability to vote
the rascals out. And that remedy is not available against private rascals.o).
345 Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 223-24 (1974) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 90-91 n.22 (1972)).
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the equally drastic step of privatizing service provision, placing the
fiduciary obligation and economic incentives of the private corpora-
tion in conflict with the well-being of needy citizens.
CONCLUSION
The privatization for profit of welfare and other social services
is a dangerous experiment. As states and private corporations scram-
ble to allocate power over the lives of this nation's neediest citi-
zens, it is important to recognize that the Constitution remains a
crucial line of defense. The safeguards of the Due Process Clause
are just as relevant and extensive in a privatized system as in a
state-operated system. While the due process rights of individual
claimants will not always trump a state interest, such rights will
certainly trump private interests. Moreover, the right to a fair hear-
ing before an impartial decision-maker is greatly magnified in im-
portance where a private corporation operates a welfare system and,
as a result, has a private pecuniary interest in the outcome. The
rhetoric of privatization may emphasize less government, but the
result of privatization is to raise due process claims for the courts
and to increase the need for monitoring by the state government
through administrative decisionmaking or judicial review. Welfare
reform has often tried to define due process down. This effort, how-
ever, overlooks the fact that the Constitution protects a core set of
dignitary rights. If these rights are eliminated in one context, they
surface in another. The federal government, states, and private
corporations unquestionably should have the flexibility to experi-
ment with welfare provision, but certain fundamental protections
cannot be compromised.
[Vol. 64: 1
